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 1 
Summary 
Since the Rome Statute entered force in 2002, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has already been operating for almost ten years. Some 
situations have been referred to the Court by possible means provided for in 
the Rome Statute. As a young criminal court, the Office of the Prosecutor, 
as an integrity part of the Court, may be the most visible organ which 
attracts worldwide attention. The Chief Prosecutor (“the Prosecutor”) is the 
crucial figure among the international legal professionals in the Court. He is 
the first one in the Court to respond to those crimes that have been 
committed and fall into the jurisdiction of the Court. Given the treaty-based 
nature of the Court, mandate of the Prosecutor and his powers provided for 
in the Rome Statute, he is a most powerful and independent prosecutor; but 
due to lack of enforcement power and independence from United Nations, 
he is a weakest prosecutor as well.  The role of the Prosecutor is crucially 
important for the ICC and international criminal justice. His selection of 
situations to investigate, identification of suspects and his performance in 
prosecution have a long-term global impact and will necessarily shapes the 
way the work of the Court will be perceived.  
In this thesis, the role of the ICC Prosecutor will be discussed in the context 
of situation in Darfur, Sudan, which is the first situation referred to the ICC 
Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council. In this situation, the 
Prosecutor seems to be confronted with criticism and suspicion in each step 
he took.  
The discussion is divided into two parts: activities and proceedings outside 
the courtroom and in the courtroom, respectively. For the former, the 
activities carried out by the Prosecutor and his Office are followed and the 
Prosecutor’s approach from conservative to confrontational is identified and 
analysis of this approach is made considering the availability of cooperation 
and external support; for the latter, the hearings in the confirmation of 
charges will be covered for discussing his failure in charge confirmation.  
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The Prosecutor appeared to perform not very well both outside and inside 
the courtroom, but there is no denying the fact that he is in the difficult 
position as the first chief prosecutor and in this tough situation. This study is 
to make an objective evaluation of the role of the ICC Prosecutor bearing in 
mind that he is confronted with unprecedented structural and political 
constraints. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
On 17 July 1998, the international community reached an historic milestone in 
international criminal justice when 120 states adopted the Rome Statute of 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the legal basis for establishing a permanent 
international criminal court. Since the Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 
2002 after ratification by 60 states, ICC has already been operating for almost ten 
years.   
The ICC is composed of four organs. They are the Presidency, the Judicial 
Division, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. Among these organs, the 
Officee of the Prosecutor (OTP)  is responsible for receiving referrals and any 
substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for 
examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the 
Court. The first Chief Prosecutor (“the Prosecutor”) was Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
from Argentina, who was elected by the State Parties for a term of nine years.  
The Prosecutor is a crucial figure among those international legal professionals in 
the Court, each of whose conduct would have long-term global impact, in 
particularly at the current phase of the Court’s whole life. Given his primary role in 
the selection of situations to investigate and cases to prosecute and the fact that he 
is a prosecutor of a permenant international criminal court, distinctive from 
prosecutors of ad hoc tribunals, he will certainly shape the way the work of the 
Court will be perceived. In this thesis, the role of the ICC Prosecutor will be 
explored to observe how he carries out his mission and fulfill his mandate, to what 
extent he exercises his power and discretion for the pursuit of international criminal 
justice and the impact of his performance. 
By the time of writing, three situations have been referred to the Prosecutor by the 
State parties- they are situation in Uganda,1 situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo2 and situation in the Central African Republic;3 two situations referred 
by the Security Council of the United Nations-Situation in Darfur, Sudan 4
                                               
1 Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04, 29 January 2004. 
and 
2 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04, 19 April 2004. 
3 Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05, 7 January 2005. 
4 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05, 31 March 2005. 
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Situation in Libya Arab Jamahiriya.5 In addition, Pre-Trial Chamber granted the 
Prosecution authorization to open an investigation proprio motu in the situation in 
the Republic of Kenya.6
The situation in Darfur, Sudan is selected in this thesis as a context to discuss the 
role of the ICC Prosecutor. It has been the first situation referred by the Security 
Council since the ICC was established and the state concerned Sudan is not a party 
to the Rome Statute, therefore this situation has its particularities compared with 
others. In judicial process of this situation, there are some controversies on the 
Prosecutor’s investigative approach and prosecutorial strategy. From the activities 
and proceedings in the cases of this situation, the Prosecutor’s performance can be 
observed and evaluated to see whether he appropriately exercises his power and 
discretion and whether his tactics serve his pursuit of international criminal justice.  
  
Given the Prosecutor’s mandate and mission laid down in the Rome Statute, 
The Prosecutor’s major task is two-fold: to investigate crimes falling within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC and to present cases at trial and on appeal if 
necessary. Hence, the prosecutor usually develops his work in two arenas: 
one is outside the courtroom and the other is in the courtroom. The tasks in 
the two places require different skills, strategies and personal qualities. For 
examining and evaluating the role of the ICC Prosecutor, the study would 
thus be based on such two scenarios. The Prosecutor’s task begins outside 
the courtroom. He has to walk out of the court for conducting investigation 
of crimes, identifing suspects and seeking cooperation and support for 
surrender of the identified suspects. After the surrender of suspects, he will 
be present in the courtroom to prosecute the accused. The successful 
prosecution of those perpetrators committing grave international crimes will 
ultimately serve the object of the ICC establishment.  
 
1.2 Purpose and Subject Matter 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the role of the Prosecutor in the pursuit of 
ending impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community. 
                                               
5 Situation in Libya Arab Jamahiriya, ICC-01/11, 26 February 2011. 
6 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, 6 November 2009. 
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The discussion will be based on specific activities and proceedings of the situation 
in Darfur. The examination and evaluation of the Prosecutor’s role will be 
developed by following the activities carrying out by his Office, outlining the 
approach that he employed as well as his skills in prosecutions.  
1.3 Methodology and Materials 
The research will employ a qualitative methodology in documentary analysis in 
examination and evaluation of the Prosecutor’s role in the situation in Darfur. This 
will involve a review of literature relating to the proceedings including decisions, 
observations, orders, judgments and other relevant judicial documents. Policy 
Papers issued by the OTP, the Prosecutor’s regular Reports and Statements 
addressed to the UN Security Council will also be utilized for the analysis. In 
addition, some study reports of social analysts and written of eminent publists will 
be referred to as second-hand resources.  
1.4 Delimitation 
The ambit of this study is limited to Situation in Darfur, Sudan as a contextual 
background for discussion.  Since the discussion will be based on the activities and 
proceedings of this situation, the scope of examination and assessment of the 
activities carried out by the Prosecutor and his Office and the proceedings in the 
Court are confined to those that have taken place by the time of writing. 
The discussion in this thesis will be divided on the basis of location where the 
Prosecutor carries out his tasks: outside the courtroom and in the courtroom. 
Although in the situation in Darfur, very few proceedings have occurred in the 
courtroom so far, it is still possible to scrutinize his role on the basis of limited 
hearings. 
1.5 Disposition 
Chapter I is the Introduction, which gives a background of the thesis topic 
and objective of the study. 
Chapter II The OTP and the Chief Prosecutor  gives a brief introduction of 
the ICC from the perspective of OTP including the powers and function of 
the OTP and the Prosecutor, the jurisdiction,  the principle of complemtarity 
and also outline the distinctiveness of the ICC Prosecutor. 
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Chapter III The Background of the Situation in Darfur, intends to give a 
factual background of the Darfur crisis and the process how the situation 
was referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council.  
Chapter IV Activities Outside the Courtroom follows the activities at the 
phase of investigation which took place mainly outside the courtroom. The 
approach that the Prosecutor used at this phase will be identified and some 
legal issues arising from these activities will be discussed in this chapter, 
including the experts’ observations on the Prosecutor’s investigative 
strategy, the controversies of the arrest warrants against a sitting head of 
state. Some reflections will be rendered to explore the understandable side 
of the Prosecutor’s loss. 
Chapter V Proceedings In the Courtroom, covers proceedings occurring in 
the courtroom though very limited hearings have taken place. 
Chapter VI is the Concluding Remarks, which will summarize the above 
chapters.  
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2 Office of the Prosecutor and the 
Chief Prosecutor 
The established instrument Rome Statute defines the role and function of 
OTP in Article 42. The OTP is a separate organ of the Court and shall act 
independently. It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and information 
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for 
conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court in accordance 
with Article 42 (1) of the Statute. The OTP is headed by the Prosecutor and 
he has full authority over the management and administration of the OTP.  
The first Chief Prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo describes his mission 
as to put an end to impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community and thus, contribute to the prevention of future 
crimes, and also his mandate as to select the situations where the Court 
should intervene, to investigate and to prosecute the gravest crimes.7
For the purpose of fulfillment of his mission and mandate, The Prosecutor 
must assess its jurisdiction, examining whether the alleged crimes are 
committed by nationals of State Parties or in the territory of State Parties. 
He also has to assess its temporal jurisdiction and whether alleged crimes 
fall under the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Besides, when a domestic 
court has concurrent jurisdiction or the proceedings take place in a domestic 
court, how the ICC can intervene and take over the case is also the 
consideration of the Prosecutor. 
 
2.1 Crimes within the Scope of the 
Prosecutor’s Investigation and Prosecution 
Four of “the most serious crimes of international concern” 8
                                               
7 L. Moreno-Ocampo, ‘The International Criminal Court-Some Reflections’, 12 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law, (2009), p.5. 
fall within the scope of 
the Prosecutor’s investigation and prosecution, they are genocide, war crimes, 
crime against humanity and crime of aggression, which are specifically provided 
for in Article 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Rome Statute. Except the crime of aggression 
8 Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
 10 
which is expected to be defined when the time is ripe for amending the 
Statute, the other three crimes are well defined in the provisions of the 
Statute. Genocide in Article 6 is basically a copy of Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(1948) (“Genocide Convention”). Crime against humanity and war crime 
are also provided in unprecedented detail. 
2.2 Temporal, Territorial and Personal 
Jurisdiction 
The ICC is a prospective institution in that it cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over crimes committed prior to the entry into force of the Statute. States 
were unwilling to allow the ICC to deal with past practices. Article 11 (1) of 
the Rome Statute declares “the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute”, that is, 
beginning on 1 July 2002.  
The Court has potentially worldwide jurisdiction, but this will be fully 
realized only after all states become parties to its Statute. Article 12 (2) 
provides that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the 
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction 
of the Court: (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question 
occurred or, if the crimes was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the 
State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the 
person accused of the crimes is a national.  
In the event of referral by the Security Council, the Court has jurisdiction 
even if none of the relevant States is a party to the Statute or gives its 
consent.  
In the light of permanent and global nature of the Court, the OTP is 
probably seized with more than one situation at a time. Usually each 
situation involved an untold number of victims and many alleged 
perpetrators, but given the limited resources of the OTP, not all perpetrators 
would be prosecuted. The Statute gives some guidance to this issue. The 
Preamble affirms that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished”. Article 5 of 
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the Statute provides that “the jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” 
and Article 17, dealing with admissibility, adds that a case is inadmissible 
where the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court. When the OTP design its prosecutorial policy and strategy, it should 
take into account the global nature of the ICC, its statutory provisions and 
logistical constraints. The general rule of a preliminary recommendation is 
“the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial 
efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as 
the leaders of the States or organization allegedly responsible for these 
crimes.”9
2.3 Triggering the Jurisdiction by the 
Prosecutor 
  
In the previous practice of war trials and existing ad hoc tribunals, there is 
no need to “trigger” the jurisdiction because the targets of prosecution have 
usually been specifically defined in the established legislative documents. 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is well circumscribed by the 
temporal, personal and territorial jurisdiction of a tribunal. But it is quite 
different with respect to the ICC. The Court’s focus of prosecution is not 
pre-determined and the Prosecutor can trigger the jurisdiction in three ways, 
which are provided for in Article 13 of the Rome Statute.  
2.3.1 Self-Referral 
The first way is self-referral. According to Article 14 (1) of the Rome 
Statute, a State may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed, 
requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of 
determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with 
the commission of such crimes. In this circumstance, the referring state must 
be a state party itself or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant 
                                               
9 Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, 2003, p.7. 
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to Article 12 (3). Early on 16 December 2003, the Government of Uganda 
referred the situation in northern Uganda, which is the first situation referred 
to the Prosecutor. Later, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the 
Central Africa Republic followed Uganda’s example and referred the 
situations in their terrorities to the Prosecutor. 
2.3.2 Referral by the Security Council 
The second way is the Security Council referral. According to Article 13 (b) 
of the Rome Statute, a situation in which one or more of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appears to have been committed may be referred to 
the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of United Nations. The situation in Darfur, Sudan is the first 
situation referred by the Security Council which will be discussed in details 
in this thesis. In the most recent, the Security Council decided unanimously 
to refer the situation in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to 
the Prosecutor, which was the second situation referred by the Security 
Council. 
2.3.3 The Prosecutor’s proprio motu Power 
The third way is that the Prosecutor may exercise his proprio motu power to 
initiate an investigation which is provided for in Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute. This is a bold innovation of the Rome Statute. Such power is the 
very discretion of the ICC Prosecutor which is significantly different from 
that of the prosecutors of other ad hoc tribunals or special courts. The 
Prosecutor may initiate investigation proprio motu on the basis of 
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor 
shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. If the Prosecutor 
concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, 
he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization 
of an investigation. Therefore, the Prosecutor’s such power is subject to 
review by the Pre-Trial Chambers, which is aimed to avoid as much as 
possible politically motivated prosecution on the one hand, on the other 
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hand, the Prosecutor could not target a situation in a solitary fashion. In the 
absence of political backing in the form of a State or Security Council 
referral, the Prosecutor would need the judicial backing of the Court.10
The decision to proceed would therefore be taken in a collective manner, 
thus not only preventing possible abuse of power but also shielding the 
Prosecutor from external pressures.
 
11 Such authorization could be deemed 
as a mechanism of the checks and balances: when the Prosecutor requests an 
arrest warrant or a confirmation of charges, the decision is made by a panel 
of judges, subject to the review of the Appeals Chambers. 12   From the 
perspective of international criminal justice, such power is of great 
importance since it can guarantee independence of the Prosecutor and 
ultimate effectiveness of a permanent international criminal court within the 
complex political context of international community. In the Prosecutor’s 
view, such power is a privilege as well as a huge responsibility. It is the first 
time the Prosecutor of an international court is given the mandate to 
independently select situations to investigate.13
2.4 The Principle of Complementarity 
  
In spite of the above three ways to trigger the jurisdiction, the Prosecutor 
will not exercise jurisdiction over these crimes directly. In the case of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the ICC operates in 
parallel with national justice systems, which are also positioned to prosecute 
the offences in question. The underlying premise of the Rome Statute is 
that, when national justice systems fail, the ICC steps in, as a last resort to 
speak.14
                                               
10 Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, ’The Role of the International Prosecutor’, in Roy S. 
Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, 
Negotiations, Resuilts, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.184. 
 Thus, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction between national systems 
and the ICC, the former takes the priority. Paragraph 10 of the preamble of 
the Rome Statute emphasizes that “the International Criminal Court 
11 Ibid. 
12 Supra note 7, p.5. 
13 Ibid. 
14 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p.171.  
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established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions”. Article 1 of the Statute repeats this principle.  
The principle of complementarity represents the explicit will of States 
parties to create an institution that is global in scope while recognizing the 
primary responsibility of States themselves to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
The principle is also based on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness 
since States will generally have the best access to evidence and witness. 
Moreover, there are limits on the number of prosecutions the ICC can 
bring. 15
Consequently, in deciding whether to investigate or prosecute, the 
Prosecutor must first assess whether there is or could be an exercise of 
jurisdiction by national systems with respect to particular crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor can proceed only where States fail 
to act, or are not “genuinely” investigating or prosecuting, as described in 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute,
 
16
The Court will be able to declare a case to be admissible when a State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 
A State is unwilling if the national decision has been made and proceedings 
are or were being undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility; there has been an unjustified delay 
which is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; 
or the proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially.
 which provides exception to the primacy 
of state jurisdiction. 
17 To assess whether a State is unable to act, the Prosecutor will 
need to determine whether “due to a total of substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to 
carry out its proceedings”.18
A Court based on the principle of complementarity ensures the international 
rule of law by creating an interdependent, mutually reinforcing international 
 
                                               
15 Supra note 9, p.4 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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system of justice. 19  The OTP encourages genuine national proceedings 
where possible, relies on national and international networks and 
participates in a system of international cooperation.20 From this principle, 
the effectiveness of the ICC should not be measured only by the number of 
cases that reach the Court. On the contrary, the absence of trials by the ICC, 
as a consequence of the effective functioning of national systems, would be 
a major success.21
2.5 Deferral 
  
The Prosecutor’s investigation and prosecution can be intervened by the 
Security Council. Article 16 of the Statute provides that “[N]o investigation 
or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under the Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions.” For such deferral, the Security Council will have to act 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, which applies only where there is “threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”. The rational of the 
intervention in judicial proceedings by a political organ lies in the priority 
choice of peace and justice. It allows the Security Council, under its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, to set aside the 
demands of justice at a time when it decides the demand of peace should 
take the priority. If the suspension of judicial proceedings leads to 
negotiation and conclusion of a peace agreement, precedence should be 
given to peace. Of course, such suspension should be only temporary.  
 
It is worthy noting that, among five permenant member states of the 
Security Council, US and China have not join the Rome Statute yet. US, 
though making constructive and helpful contribution during the Statute 
                                               
19 Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, The Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, 14 September 
2006, p5. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Supra note 9, p.1. 
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drafting, resigned its siganiture so as to exclude its nationals from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.  China did not sign the Rome Statute because it has 
major reservations on a series issues such as the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu power, the definition of crimes against humanity.    
2.6 The Distinctiveness of the ICC Prosecutor 
2.6.1 A Most Powerful and Independent Prosecutor 
Each international criminal judicial institution has its legal basis of foundation. The 
earlier International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established by London 
Treaty signed by four Allied states. The two ad hoc tribunals after the cold war 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are all created on the basis of the Security 
Council resolutions. Other special tribunals such as Special Court of Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are usually set up by the agreements22
Unlike its precedents, the ICC was established by a multilateral treaty.  The 
multilateral treaty-based court renders the ICC strikingly different from its 
precedents and the ICC Prosecutor bears the outcome of such differences.  
Given the personal, temporal and territory jurisdictions provided in the 
Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor can exercise the widest jurisdiction rather 
than being restricted narrowly by the Security Council resolutions or any 
other agreement. Moreover, the creative propri motu power authorized him 
to decide when and where to initiate an investigation, which has never been 
granted to the prosecutors of other tribunals. Therefore, the ICC Prosecutor 
ends up being a most powerful and independent prosecutor.  
 between UN 
and State governments concerned.  
2.6.2 A Weakest Prosecutor 
On the other side, the circumstances where the Prosecutor will act will differ 
from situation to situation. He may for example have to act in a situation of 
                                               
22 In broad term, such agreement falls into the category of treaty. 
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violence over which the State authorities have no control. The Prosecutor 
may also be asked to act in a situation where those who have the legitimate 
monopoly of force in a State are themselves the ones to commit or having 
committed the crimes, and the enforcement authorities in that State will 
consequently not be available to the Prosecutor. In these circumstances, the 
Prosecutor will not be able to exercise his powers without the intervention 
of the international community, regardless through the use of peacekeeping 
forces or otherwise; the Prosecutor will not be able to establish an office in 
the country concerned without being assured of its safety. He will also have 
to be assured that there will be the means available for investigation, 
protection of witnesses and arrest of suspects. 23  Unlike prosecutor in 
national courts, a national prosecutor acts within a State which has the 
monopoly of force in its terrority. The enforcement agencies of the State are 
subject to the rule of law and are at the disposal of the national prosecution 
system.24
All the contemporary international criminal judicial institutions would face 
a challenge -the absence of enforcement powers in that they do not have 
police and military force to assist the prosecutors’ tasks and enforce the 
decisions of the courts. This problem is even more serious for the ICC due 
to their different established basis and background. 
 For ICC Prosecutor, external support is crucially important for the 
fulfillment of tasks.  
The earlier Nuremberg Tribunal was a product of the London Treaty which 
was signed by Allied powers, which was equipped with enforcement teeth 
by the occupation of the Allied states. The Tokyo Tribunal was more tricky 
in that its foundation was rested on General MacArthor’s proclamation 
establishing another tribunal patterened after Nuremberg Tribunal and his 
subsequent appointment of its judges, so the enforcement has never been a 
major barrier. For the recent precedents, ICTY and ICTR could at least in 
theory be backed up by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter when enforcement is required. Notably, ICTY was created 
during the on-going armed conflicts and once faced with difficulties of lack 
                                               
23 supra note 9, pp.5-6. 
24 Ibid., p.1. 
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of an occupation army support to enforce its decisions. But later, Annex 1-A 
of Dayton Peace Agreement included an obligation on all the former 
Yugoslav States to cooperate with the ICTY 25  and provided that 
international forces in former Yugoslavia had the authority to arrest those 
indicted by the ICTY.26
For the courts with a hybrid nature, the SCSL was established by treaty 
between government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations for the request 
from the President of Sierra Leone to the Security Council for the creation 
of a special court to deal with crimes committed in the civil war. The 
agreement between the Government and the UN Secretary-General was 
signed attaching the Statute of the Court and Sierra Leone adopted 
implementing legislation.
  
27
For the above international criminal judicial institutions, in spite of lack of 
enforcement power, they are more or less buttressed by political will of 
some states or groups concerned.
 An similar agreement between the UN and 
Cambodian government was adopted by the General Assembly, ratified by 
the Cambodian National Assembly and ECCC was established. The 
Extraordinary Chambers form part of the domestic system of Cambodia. 
These hybrid courts are combined with international and national elements 
and they can rely on domestic systems for enforcement.  
28
For the ICC, legally and theoretically speaking, it is least politically biased 
with least external backing if not at all. It is neither a court created by the 
intent of the victors of armed conflicts for legitimatize their victory or their 
subsequent rule in their territory nor the one set up during the on-going 
conflicts motivated by some state group’s intent to intervene in the name of 
whole international community. There is no denying the fact that political 
will, to a certain extent, in the form of legal means, guarantees the 
  
                                               
25 Article X of Annex 1-A of Dayton Peace Agreement, available at 
http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm.  
26 Article IV (4) Annex 1-A of Dayton Peace Agreement. 
27 The Special Court Agreement (2002) Ratification Act, Suppl.  Cryer, Hakan Friman, 
Darryl Robinson, Elizabeth Wilmshurst: An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.150-151. 
28 But the so-called enforcement powers were highly politicalized and thus their judicial 
nature were diluted.  
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enforcement of the judicial decisions. This is crucial for the ICC Prosecutor 
since he would be the first one in the Court who has to seek cooperation and 
support from international community for the purpose of investigation, 
surrender of suspects and so forth. An ambitious mandate with weakest 
equipment renders state cooperation and other external support of prime 
importance for the ICC Prosecutor, but such enforcing resources are of less 
predictability. In this sense, the ICC Prosecutor is the weakest prosecutor in 
the world.  
 20 
3 The Background of Situation in 
Darfur 
3.1 Factual Background of the Darfur Crisis 
3.1.1 Overview of the Conflict in Darfur 
For a better understand of the situation in Darfur, it is very important to 
obtain an overview of origins and development of the conflict. 
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa with a territory bordering Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya. The Darfur region is 
a geographically large area in the western part of the Sudan. The roots of 
present conflict in Darfur are very complex. In addition to the tribal feuds 
resulting from desertification, the availability of modern weapons, and other 
factors noted above, deep layers relating to identity, governance and the 
emergence of armed rebel movements which enjoy popular support amongst 
certain tribes, are playing a major role in shaping the current crisis.29 The 
two rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), citing similar reasons 
for the rebellion including socio-economic and political marginalization of 
Darfur  and its people, organized themselves in the course of 2001 and 2002 
in opposition to the Khartoum Government, which was perceived to be the 
main cause of the problems in Darfur. Both rebel groups had a clearly stated 
political agenda involving the entirety of the Sudan, demanding more equal 
participation in government by all groups and regions of the Sudan.30
The conflict began in approximately August 2002 with the government 
attempts to control the insurgency through deployment of the Sudanese 
  
                                               
29 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 
Geneva, 25 January 2005, [Report of Darfur Commission], para 61. 
30 Ibid., para 62.  
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Armed Forces (SAF). On 25 April 2003, An attack against El Fasher, the 
capital of North Darfur state, by SLA inflicted unprecedented losses on the 
government. After the attack, the government ceased peace negotiations 
with the rebels and initiated a counterinsurgency campaign in North and 
West Darfur. As part of the campaign, the government recruited a large 
number of militia known as Janjaweed. SAF with Janjaweed launched 
attacks on towns controlled by the rebels. 
In April 2004, the government and the rebels signed a ceasefire agreement. 
Despite the agreement, the rebels continued their attacks in South, leading 
the government to initiate another major military operation in December. By 
January 2005, government armed forces reached the base of the rebel.  
3.1.2 Crimes Committed in Darfur 
By all accounts, the armed conflict in Darfur has been a humanitarian 
catastrophe. While there has been some controversy about the number of 
deaths caused by the conflict,31 there is no doubt that the ruthless counter-
insurgency led by the government forces and the Janjaweed militias 
involved war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the meantime, the 
rebels may also be responsible for a significant number of war crimes, 
including attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers.32
By the second half of 2004, Darfur was receiving extensive media coverage 
and visits of senior officials from western states. The reports of international 
humanitarian agencies and the media showed the existence of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.  
  
                                               
31 US State Department’s estimate of deaths in Darfur was 60,000to 160,000, in 2004, 
World Health Organization reported that 70,000 had died; other authorities suggest that 
mortality is likely to be closer to 400,000, See Darfur’s Real Death Toll, Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12485-2005Apr23.html, retrieved on 8 
May 2011. It is almost impossible to estimate exactly how many of Darfur’s six million 
inhabitants are affected by the conflict although it is clear that the related in security has 
affected most of the inhabited areas of Darfur. See Office of UN Resident and 
Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sudan, “Darfur Humanitarian Profile No.3”, 1 July 
2004. 
32 See Human Rights Watch, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the 
Events in Darfur 3-4, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/sudan0606/sudan0606.pdf.  retrieved 
on 9 May 2011. 
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In 2005, the US government began an investigation into what was 
happening in Darfur which included interviews with refugees in eastern 
Chad and sophisticated use of satellite imagery. It produced a well-
documented report with evidence that war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and most participants in the investigation agreed that the events 
met the test for genocide. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, called the 
government’s counter-insurgency war “genocide”.33
3.2 The Report of UN International 
Commission of Inquiry in Darfur  
  
Given the crisis in Darfur, in 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1564 to “request the Secretary-General rapidly establish an international 
commission of inquiry in order to immediately to investigate reports of 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur 
by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have 
occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to 
ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.”34 In October 2004, 
the Secretary General appointed Antonio Cassese , Mohamed Fayek, Hina 
Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott as members of the UN 
International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur (“Darfur Commission”) and 
Cassese served as the Chairperson. The Commission were requested to 
report back on their findings within three months. The Commission engaged 
in a regular dialogue with the Government of the Sudan throughout its 
mandate, in particular through meetings in Geneva and in the Sudan, as well 
as through the work of its investigative team. 35
                                               
33 Sudan Tribunal, ”US State Dept. Still Characterizes Darfur Situation as Genocide”, 19 
June 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/US-State-Dept-still-characterizes,31555 , 
retrieved on 4 June, 2011. 
 The Darfur Commission 
visited Sudan including travel to the three Darfur States. During its presence 
in the Sudan, it held extensive meetings with representatives of the 
Government, the Governors of the Darfur States and other senior officials in 
34 UNSC Res 1564 (September 18, 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1564 (2004), para 12. 
35 Report of Darfur Commission, p.2. 
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the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed forces 
and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced 
persons, victims and witnesses of violations, NGOs and United Nations 
representatives.36
3.2.1 Key Findings of the Darfur Commission 
  
The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-
General on 25 January 2005. The Report addressed the findings in relation 
to the key tasks referred to in the resolution 1564. In accordance with its 
mandate to “investigate reports of violations of human rights law and 
international humanitarian law”, the Commission established that the 
Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to 
crimes under international law.37 In particular, the Commission found that 
Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including 
killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, 
throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and 
systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.38 
While the Commission did not find a systematic or a widespread pattern to 
these violations, it found credible evidence that rebel forces, namely 
members of the SLA and JEM, also are responsible for serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to war 
crimes.39 In particular, these violations include cases of murder of civilians 
and pillage. 40  But regarding the acts of genocide, the Commission 
concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of 
genocide. 41
                                               
36 Ibid. 
 The Commission identified a number of individual perpetrators 
who are possibly responsible for the above-mentioned violations, including 
37 Ibid., p.3. 
38 Ibid., p.3. 
39 Ibid., p.4. 
40 Ibid., p.4. 
41 Ibid., p.5. 
 24 
officials of the Government of Sudan, members of militia forces, members 
of rebel groups, and certain foreign army officers acting in their personal 
capacity. Some Government officials as well as members of militia forces, 
have also been identified as possibly responsible for joint criminal 
enterprise to commit international crimes. Others are named for their 
possible involvement in planning and/or ordering the commission of 
international crimes, or of aiding and abetting the perpetration of such 
crimes. The Commission also has identified a number of senior Government 
officials and military commanders who may be responsible, under the 
notion of superior (or command) responsibility, for knowingly failing to 
prevent or repress the perpetration of crimes. Members of rebel groups are 
also named as suspected of participating in a joint criminal enterprise to 
commit international crimes, and as possibly responsible for knowingly 
failing to prevent or repress the perpetration of crimes committed by 
rebels.42
3.2.2 Recommendations of the Darfur Commission 
  
With regard to the accountability mechanisms, the Darfur Commission 
strongly recommended the referral of the situation of Darfur to the ICC by 
the UN Security Council,43 based on the justification of six major merits. 44
                                               
42 Ibid., p.5. 
 
First, the International Criminal Court was established with an eye to crimes 
likely to threaten peace and security. This is the main reason why the 
Security Council may trigger the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 13 (b) of 
the Rome Statute. The investigation and prosecution of crimes perpetrated 
in Darfur would have an impact on peace and security. More particularly, it 
would be conducive, or contribute to, peace and stability in Darfur, by 
43 Ibid., para 569. 
44 Sudan signed the Rome Statute of the ICC on 8 September 2000, but has not yet ratified 
it and is thus not a State party. The prosecution of nationals of a State that is not party to the 
Rome Statute is possible under limited circumstances. First, according to article 12 (2)(a) of 
Rome Statute , it is obviously applicable in Darfur crisis since the crimes occurred in the 
Sudan and were allegedly committed by Sudanese nationals; secondly, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction can be trigged by a referral to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter according to article 13 (b); thirdly, the Sudan may, by 
declaration lodged with the Court’s Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Court with respect to the crimes in question, para. 583. 
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removing serious obstacles to national reconciliation and the restoration of 
peaceful relations. Second, as the investigation and prosecution in the Sudan 
of persons enjoying authority and prestige in the country and wielding 
control over the State apparatus, is difficult or even impossible, resort to the 
ICC, the only truly international institution of criminal justice, which would 
ensure that justice be done. The fact that trials proceedings would be 
conducted in the Hague, the seat of the ICC, far away from the community 
over which those persons still wield authority and where their followers 
live, might ensure a neutral atmosphere and prevent the trials from stirring 
up political, ideological or other passions. Third, only the authority of the 
ICC, backed up by that of the United Nations Security Council, might 
compel both leading personalities in the Sudanese Government and the 
heads of rebels to submit to investigation and possibly criminal proceedings. 
Fourth, the Court, with an entirely international composition and a set of 
well-defined rules of procedure and evidence, is the best suited organ for 
ensuring a veritably fair trial of those indicted by the Prosecutor. Fifth, the 
ICC could be activated immediately, without any delay (which would be the 
case if one were to establish ad hoc tribunals or so called mixed or 
internationalized courts). Sixth, the institution of criminal proceedings 
before the ICC, at the request of the Security Council, would not necessarily 
involve a significant financial burden for the international community.45 The 
Commission also excluded the advisability of other mechanisms such as 
setting up ad hoc tribunals, expanding to mandate of existing ad hoc 
tribunals and establishing mixed courts.46
                                               
45 Ibid., para 572. 
  
46Ibid.,  para 573-582. 
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3.3 The Referral of Situation in Darfur by the 
Security Council 
3.3.1 The Referring Resolution 1593 
Soon after the Report of the Darfur Commission, on 31 March 2005,the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1593 by vote of 11 in favor to none 
against, with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China and United States).47
In this resolution, the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and referred the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to 
the Prosecutor of the ICC. It decides the Government of Sudan and all other 
parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with the Court and the 
Prosecutor and invites African Union to discuss practical arrangements. The 
Prosecutor is invited to report to the Security Council regularly on actions 
taken pursuant to this resolution. 
  
Among the positions of member States, United States insisted that a better 
mechanism would have been a hybrid tribunal in Africa and continued to 
fundamentally object to the view that the ICC should be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials of States not 
party to the Rome Statute. 48  China supported a political solution and 
preferred that the perpetrators stand trial in Sudanese courts. China believed 
the perpetrators must be brought to justice, but it was important to sustain 
the hard-won gains of the North-South peace process. 49   Sudanese 
Ambassador El-Fatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa warned the Council that the 
“resolution would only serve to weaken prospects for settlement and further 
complicate the already complex situation”. 50
                                               
47 Press release: 
  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm , retrived on 4 
March, 2011. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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3.3.2 The Flaws in Resolution 1593 
3.3.2.1 The Source of Funds 
Paragraph 7of the Resolution dealing with funds provided that UN will not 
burden all the expenses resulting from any judicial activities related to the 
referral. In this way, the Security Council precluded the financial burden 
arising from the referral, which in fact removed a substantial back-up from 
the judicial solution. In the case of ad hoc Tribunals formally created by the 
Security Council, it is normal that they be financed out of UN resources. 
The ICC is not a UN organ and it seems unreasonable that its facilities be 
offered to the UN for free. Article 15 of the Rome Statute dealing with 
funds of the Court specifies two sources of funds, one is assessed 
contributions made by State Parties and the other is funds provided by the 
United Nations subject to the approval of the General Assembly, in 
particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referral by the Security 
Council. This provision per se is not binding upon the Security Council. But 
the United Nations and the ICC agreed that “the conditions under which any 
funds may be provided to the Court by a decision of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations pursuant to Article 115 of the Statue shall be subject 
to separate arrangements.”51 In the Resolution 1593, the unilateral ruling out 
of the provision of funds by the United Nations to the Court in connection 
with Darfur is at odds not only with the decision to refer, but also with the 
duty of good faith negotiations, which flows from the obligation mutually 
agreed upon between the ICC and the United Nations.52 The cut of the funds 
is not consistent with the initial intention of the Darfur Commission for the 
recommendation of referral, which expected the criminal proceedings before 
the ICC, at the request of the Security Council, would not necessarily 
involve a significant financial burden for the international community.53
                                               
51 Article13 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the United 
Nations of 4 October 2004, entered into force on the same date, available online at 
  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1__English.pdf.  
52 Luigi Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi, Comments on the Security Council Referral of 
the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005),  
p.594.   
53 Report of Darfur Commission, para 572. 
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3.3.2.2 The Absence of Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute 
Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute is the legal basis of the Security Council 
referring a situation to the Prossecutor. And Article 16, on the other hand, 
defines the role of the Security Council to stop ongoing or impending 
proceedings before the Court. Naturally, as a resolution of referring a 
situation to the Court, it is necessary with reference to Article 13 in the 
resolution text. However, this provision is not present in any paragraph of 
the resolution. Such absence is somewhat suspicious when one contrasts it 
with the express reference to Article 16. It is not clear whether the members 
of the Security Council intended to avoid an express link between the 
referral and Article 13.54
3.3.2.3 The Blurring Obligation of States to Cooperate with 
the ICC 
  
Article 86 of the Rome Statute provides State parties’ general obligation to 
cooperate with the Court. The subsequent provisions laid down in Part 9 of 
the Statute specify that state parties to the Statute are under an obligation to 
cooperate with the Court. State not party to the Statute may also be brought 
under an international obligation to cooperate with the Court by “any other 
appropriate basis” that is laid down in Article 87 (5). Such appropriate basis 
could be provided by a resolution of the Security Council under Article 41 
of the UN Charter, imposing obligations upon all member states to apply 
measures to give effect to Security Council decisions. It would be perfectly 
conceivable that the Security Council could adopt a resolution which 
obliges all member states to cooperate with the Court.55
                                               
54Luigi Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi, Comments on the Security Council Referral of the 
Situation in Darfur to the ICC, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005),  p.592. 
 In theory, It would 
seems natural that a decision to this effect should be included in a resolution 
where the Security Council decides to refer a situation to the ICC and one 
could even argue that at least one of the implications of such a referral is 
55 For this view, see A. Ciampi, ‘The Obligation to Cooperate’, in A. Cassese et al.(eds), 
The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 1607-1638, at 1611. See Luigi Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi, 
Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005), p.593. 
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that all member states are automatically put under an international binding 
obligation to cooperate with the Court.  
However, paragraph 2 of the resolution provided that the Government of 
Sudan and all other parties to the conflict alone are under the obligation to 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court. It 
didn’t precisely provide that non-state parties to the Rome Statute have 
binding obligations under the Statute but only “urge” all States and regional 
and other international organizations concerned to cooperate fully. In this 
sense, it is assumed the Security Council did not intend to create binding 
obligations to all UN member states. Such assumption goes against the 
intention of drafting Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. At the Rome 
Conference, a clear majority of delegations supported the power of the 
Security Council to initiate proceedings of the Court. Article 13 (b) of the 
Statute thereby acknowledges the enforcement powers of the Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, to refer a situation to the Prosecutor in 
which one or more crimes falling within jurisdiction of the Court appear to 
have been committed. These enforcement powers of the Security Council 
bind all Members of the United Nations. 56
The flaws existing in Resolution 1593 would necessarily affect the 
successful operation of judicial process.  
 Paragraph 2 of the resolution 
actually implicitly allowed non-cooperation of other member states, which 
would be a fatal loophole of the resolution for successful operation of the 
judicial solution of Darfur conflict. 
 
                                               
56 Lionel Yee,  ’The International Criminal Court and the Security Council’, Article 13 (b) 
and 16, in Roy S. Lee (eds.), The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome 
Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.147. 
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4 Activities Outside the 
Courtroom 
4.1 The Investigation at the Initial Phase 
After the Security Council referred the situation to the Prosecutor, on 21 
April 2005, President Kirsch assigned the situation in Darfur, Sudan to Pre-
Trial Chamber I (PTC I).57
In the initial phase, the main efforts of the Prosecutor were devoted to the 
“an extensive process of information gathering”.
 On 1 June 2005, the Prosecutor determined that 
there was a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation, and he notified the 
Chambers and the Presidency accordingly and announced his decision to 
open a formal investigation, reaching out to the Khartoum government to 
establish a foundation for future cooperation.  
58 The OTP took a number 
of practical steps. Within the OTP, a multi-disciplinary joint team has been 
convened, comprising staff from each of the three divisions within the 
Office.  Additional personnel for three divisions were recruited and persons 
with relevant language expertise was identified and recruited. The Office 
applied the experience gained in relation to other situations such as DRC 
and North Uganda and benefited from the lessons of the ad hoc international 
tribunals.59 The Prosecutor also acknowledged that the protection of victims 
and witnesses is a major challenge in any conflict situation and it is a core 
responsibility shared by OTP and the Registry.60
In Prosecutor’s second report in early 2006 to the SC, he reported that “the 
Office is currently screening hundreds of other potential witnesses either 
directly or with the assistance of states and organizations. To facilitate this 
  
                                               
57 Decision Assigning the Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-02/05-01-
Corr, The Presidency, 21 April 2011. 
58 Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005), p.1. 
59 Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005), p.8. 
60 Ibid. 
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process, the Office has established a semi-permanent presence in the region, 
which provides logistical, security and other support to the process of 
witness identification and interview”.61
4.1.1 Invitation of Amicus Curiae by Pre-Trial 
Chamber 
  
In 2006, more than a year after the referral, the Prosecutor.didn’t apply any 
arrest warrant or summons to appear. Some commentators deemed the 
Prosecutor acted too prudently.62 The PTC I seemed not satisfied with the 
Prosecutor’s slow pace in investigation. Based on Article 57 (3)(c) of the 
Statute63 and Rule 103 of  Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Amicus curiae 
and other forms of submission), PTC I considered it necessary to request 
some opinions from the third party. But, in reality, the judges were 
questioning the Prosecutor’s claim that he could not conduct investigation 
within Darfur because of the security situation.64 Two amicus curiae were 
invited for their views on issues concerning protection of victims and 
preservation of evidence: Professor Antonio Cassese, the first President of 
ICTY and also the Chair of the Darfur Commission whose report provoked 
the Darfur referral, and Louise Abour, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and the former Chief Prosecutor of ICTY and ICTR.  
Their observations65
                                               
61 Second Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council Pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593 (2005), p.4. 
 were submitted in August and September 2006 
respectively. Both took the view that the Prosecutor had exaggerated the 
62 In a journal article of the same year, in a section titled “The Exceedingly Prudent Attitude 
of the ICC Prosecutor”, Professor Antonio Cassese discussed the Prosecutor’s activities at 
early stage, see Antonio Cassess, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems? Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 4 (2006). pp. 434-441. 
63 Article 57 (3)(c)provides “In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the Pre-
Trial Chamber may (c) Where necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims 
and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of persons who have been 
arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and the protection of national security 
information”. 
64 William A. Schabas,  supra note 14, p.49. 
65 Observations on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and The Preservation of 
Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending Before the ICC, PTC I, ICC-02/05-14, 25 
August 2006, [‘Cassese Observation’], Louise Arbour; Observations of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights invited in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ICC-02/05-19, PTC I, 10 October 2006,[‘Arbour Observation’].  
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security problems involved in investigating within Darfur and acted too 
cautiously. 
4.1.1.1 Cassese Observation 
The wording of Cassese Observation reads rather critical like a teacher’s  
worst evaluation of his student’s schoolwork and instruction on what should 
have been done. 
Cassese submitted the recommendation of general and specific measures of 
protection of victims and measures of preservation of evidence and 
proposals relating to investigative strategy and policy, modes of liability and 
means of proof under the Rome Statute.  
Regarding the protection of victims, he submitted that the most effective 
way is to collect evidence about the possible criminal responsibility 
attributable to military forces of Sudan (as well as to armed militias)and 
those of the rebel groups.66  The identification of chain of command can 
save the efforts to investigate at the crime scenes by establishing criminal 
responsibility of those who are in a position to forestall or stop commission 
of crimes since it would be no avail for a military commander to argue that 
he cannot identify the specific authors of crimes under his command and 
control.67 He also suggested that, the Prosecutor could ask, either directly or 
through a request issued, upon his request by the PTC that the relevant 
Sudanese officials appear before the Chamber to report on the specific 
measures for the protection of victims they have adopted or intend to take or 
are in the process of taking.68
To sum up, in the view of Cassese, the Prosecutor had not sufficiently made 
use of resources available to him for effective investigation. 
   
4.1.1.2 Arbour Observation 
Unlike Cassese, Arbour used very diplomatic wording in her submission. 
She systemically described the tasks which have been done by the Office of 
                                               
66 Cassese Observation, p.4. 
67 Ibid., p.8. 
68 Ibid., p.4. 
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High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the situation of conflict 
in general by drawing out some key lessons in Darfur and other locations.  
From the practical experience of OHCHR, she summarized some key 
implications for ICC investigation in Darfur. She acknowledged the 
existence of risk but pointed out that “[R]isks can never be eliminated 
absolutely but can be minimized with the use of tailored and best practice 
investigative techniques that, inter alia, give due weight to the informed 
wishes of the persons concerned”.69 She told the PTC that “it is possible to 
conduct serious investigations of human rights violations during an armed 
conflict in general, and in Darfur in particular, without putting victims at 
unreasonable risk”70 and “the careful assessment by the ICC Prosecutor of 
risks to witnesses and victims needs a balancing of different factors” ,71  
particularly in the case of ICC investigation in Darfur, the balancing may 
require a determination of whether the possible risks created by victims’ 
contact with ICC investigators are greater than the danger they face daily by 
the continuation or escalation of the conflict and commission of related 
crimes. In turn, this determination should also take into account the possible 
deterrent effect of ICC investigations on the perpetrators of the very crimes 
which put the civilian population at risk and thus of its impact on the 
general reduction of violence. 72  She highlighted the effectiveness of 
unarmed international presence in a conflict zone and was of view that ICC 
must  clearly be part of such presence.73 She also noted the clear failure or 
unwillingness  by the Government of Sudan and suggested that the ICC 
must be able to exercise the full force of its mandate. 74  Finally she 
submitted that the security challenges particular to investigation of 
international crimes while an armed conflict is ongoing should not per se 
prevent the Court from acting in pursuance of its international mandate 
towards timely and effective individual criminal accountability.75
                                               
69 Arbour Observation, p.2. 
  
70 Ibid., para 64. 
71 Ibid., para 67.   
72 Ibid., para 68. 
73 Ibid., para 70. 
74 Ibid., para 75. 
75 Ibid., para 80. 
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She did not specifically instruct the Prosecutor what should be done and 
made all comments to the ICC as a whole which seemed less offensive to 
the Prosecutor personally.   
As the High Commissioner, she provided some delicate analysis and 
experience from which OHCHR has developed in its field tasks. From her 
previous experience as ICTY Prosecutor, she admitted that the main terrain 
of the ICTY’s early operations was an active war zone but she believe that 
her Tribunal should have attempted to increase its presence in the region as 
opportunities presented themselves.76
4.1.2 The Prosecutor’s Response to Both 
Observations 
  
The Prosecutor seemed stung by PTC’s intention of amicus curiae invitation 
and the observations of two experts. Under Rule 103 of Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, he had a right to reply.  
4.1.2.1 Response to Cassese Observation77
Examining the points outlined by Professor Cassese, the Prosecutor 
responded that OTP do not have a mandate under the Statute to establish or 
promote security in Darfur generally and pointed out that “[R]esponsibility 
for security of the civilian population in Darfur rests with the Government 
of Sudan, the Security Council working with the African Union (AU) and 
other relevant organizations.”
 
78  Observations on the wider issues of 
investigative strategy and policy, modes of liability and means of proof are 
beyond the scope of the Decision inviting observations. 79
                                               
76 Louise Abour, ’The Crucial Years’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 
p.401-402. 
 The measures 
recommended by Professor Cassese to protect victims and witness and 
preserve evidence are beyond the scope of Article 68 (1) because at that 
time, the OTP is not taking statements in Darfur and therefore there is no 
77 Prosecutor’s response to Cassese’s Observation on Issues Concerning the Protection of 
Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the 
ICC, ICC-02/05-16, 11 September 2006, [Response to Cassese Observation]. 
78 Ibid., para 8. 
79 Ibid. 
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witness to protect there. 80
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor further clarified some issues for the purpose of 
transparency. Regarding the security situation in Darfur, in spite of the 
involvement of UN and AU, the security situation remained unoptimistic.
 The Prosecutor was of view that the Cassese 
Observations mistakenly broadened the meaning of Article 68 (1) to 
encompass the provision of protective measures which might promote the 
creation of witnesses instead of protecting witnesses and victims within the 
scope of the investigation. Thus the investigative measures he suggested 
encroach upon the Prosecutor’s discretion provided for in Article 42 (1).  
81 
He emphasized that he decided not to conduct investigation at this time 
inside Darfur where either meaningful security exists or effective protective 
measures can be provided to victims and witnesses.82 As his investigative 
strategy, the OTP had carried out investigations with a duty to protect 
victims and witness in accordance with the Rome Statute and this is the best 
contribution to the ICC and OTP would seek to complete the investigation 
and planning of the presentation of the first case and also would continue to 
assess on an ongoing basis the admissibility of cases.83
4.1.2.2 Response to Arbour Observation
  
84
In response to Arbour Observation, similarly, the Prosecutor again 
considered that the methods outlined by her went beyond the scope of 
Article 68 (1) of the Statute with the same reason given in response to 
Cassese Observation.
 
85
Nevertheless, he still made comments on observations made by Arbour in 
three aspects.
  
86
                                               
80 Ibid. 
 First, regarding the security situation in Darfur related to 
witness security, he insisted that the security situation remains extremely 
volatile despite numerous resolutions passed by the Security Council and 
81 Ibid., paras 11-15. 
82 Ibid., para 16. 
83 Ibid., paras 18-22. 
84 Prosecutor’s response to Arbour’s observations of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights invited in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of 
Prosecutor and Evidence,ICC-02/05-21, 19 October 2006, [Response to Arbour 
Observation]. 
85 Ibid., para 8. 
86 Ibid., para 9. 
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AU and this was also stated by High Commissioner.87 Secondly, as for High 
Commissioner’s broad construction of the Court’s obligation in respect of 
witness in Darfur, the Prosecutor considered that, deterrence is a 
consequence of prosecution and accountability but not an independent 
objective, the OTP’s mandate cannot be expanded to encompass a duty to 
protect the civilians in areas where it had chosen not to investigate. 
Although judicial efforts play a important role in the protection of civilians 
and prevention of future crimes, the Court has neither the obligation nor the 
authority directly to do so and the presence of investigators or international 
personnel which can be expected to increase security actually would be 
counterfactual.88 Thirdly, the Prosecutor outlined significant distinctions in 
mandates between himself and High Commissioner Arbour. The 
Prosecutor’s role is to investigate and establish criminal responsibility under 
the Rome Statute and the legal consequence of his work may be a criminal 
trial while High Commissioner’s mandate includes promoting and 
protecting the effective enjoyment of human rights in all aspects covering 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social fields.89 With respect to the 
issue of protection of witness, those witnesses who speak with 
representatives of the Court are at far higher risk than those who talk to 
human rights observers and members of the Darfur Commission. 90  The 
Prosecutor must protect witnesses in accordance with his legal obligations 
set out within the framework of the Rome Statute specified in Article 
54(1)(b), 54 (3)(f) and 68 (1).91
Finally, the Prosecutor concluded that he determined the continuing 
insecurity in Darfur prevents the establishment of an effective system of 
victim and witness protection inside Darfur.
  
92
Regarding both Observations, in the view of the Prosecutor, the OTP was 
bound by the Statute’s standards of protection for witnesses and victims, the 
experience of the Darfur Commission and the OHCHR in their own 
  
                                               
87 Ibid., para 10. 
88 Ibid., paras 11-14. 
89 Ibid., para 16. 
90 Ibid., para 17. 
91 Ibid., para 18. 
92 Ibid., para 20, emphasis added by the author. 
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operation was irrelevant. Moreover, since the Prosecutor’s investigations 
could lead to legal action, he asserted that resistance to the ICC activities in 
Darfur would likely to be much stiffer than it had been to the mere 
information-gathering activities with which Arbour and Cassese were 
familiar.  
In the Report to the Security Council in December 2006, however, he did 
not express the skirmish with the PTC and the admonitions of two experts93 
but simply mentioned PTC’s invitation of opinions from the two experts as 
narrative 94 and his response and still insisted that “the Office has conducted 
its investigation from outside Darfur and therefore avoided exposing victims 
and witnesses to additional risks. Despite this, his Office has made 
significant advances in the completion of the investigation of the first 
case”,95
4.2 The First Major Step-The First Two 
Arrest Warrants 
 indicating that the Prosecutor did not accept recommendations on 
investigation recommended by the two experienced experts.   
In spite of rejection of recommendations of two Observations, it is doubtless 
that they worked as catalyst and the Prosecutor was instigated by the 
opinions and implicitly responded to PTC’s dissatisfaction with his slow 
pace. On 27 February 2007, the Prosecutor, in accordance with Art 58(7) of 
the Statute, 96
                                               
93William A. Schabas, supra note 14 , p.51. 
 applied to PTC I for two summonses of appear for two 
suspects, Ahmad Harun, Former Minister of State for the Interior of the 
94 Fourth Reports of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 14 December 2006, p.2  
95 Ibid., p.3 
96 Art 58 (7) reads:”As an alternative to seeking a warrant of arrest, the Prosecutor may 
submit anapplication requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons for the 
personto appear. If the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
tobelieve that the person committed the crime alleged and that a summons is sufficient to 
ensure the person's appearance, it shall issue the summons, with orwithout conditions 
restricting liberty (other than detention) if provided for by national law, for the person to 
appear. The summons shall contain: (a) The name of the person and any other relevant 
identifying information; (b) The specified date on which the person is to appear; (c) A 
specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person is 
alleged to have committed; and (d) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to 
constitute the crime.The summons shall be served on the person.” 
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Government of Sudan and Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of 
Sudan and Ali Kushayb, alleged leader of the Militia/Janjaweed. In the 
Prosecutor’s Application, he alleged that Harun and Kushayb are criminally 
responsible for 51 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As for 
the modes of liability, he alleged that Haroun and Kushayb were part of a 
“group of person acting with a common purpose” to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, in violation of Article 25 (3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute.97
Notably, the request for summonses, rather than warrants of arrest, 
implicitly invited the Sudanese authorities to cooperate with the ICC and 
turn over the two suspects. The Prosecutor appeared to trust, at a minimum 
degree, the Sudanese government’s previous willingness to provide the OTP 
with documents and allow the OTP to interview high-ranking government 
officials. But in the Application, the Prosecutor also submitted that any 
official response or action of the Sudanese Government, or of Harun or 
Kushayb to the filing of this application to the effect that they will resist or 
fail to comply with any decision by the PTC on this matter, would justify 
the PTC’s determination to issue arrest warrants instead.
  
98
After examining the application, PTC I is of view that summonses to appear 
are not sufficient to ensure the persons to appear.
  
99 Regarding Ali Kushayb, 
he was reported to be in prison upon an warrant of arrest issued by the 
Sudanese authorities and the Prosecution’s supporting materials would not 
lead to the conclusion that Ali Kushayb would appear voluntarily before the 
Court while being detained by the Sudanese authorities.100 Moreover, the 
Chamber is of view that issuing a summons to appear for a person currently 
detained by national authorities would be contrary to the object and purpose 
of Art 58 (7) of the Statute101
                                               
97 Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art 58 (7) of the Statute, ICC-02/05-
01/07-1, PTC I, 27 April 2007 , para 176.. 
 since the list of those conditions provided for 
in Rule 119 of the Rules indicate that a summons to appear is intended to 
98 Ibid., para 278. 
99 Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art 58 (7) of the Statute, ICC-02/05-
01/07, PTC I, 27 April 2007, para 124. 
100 Ibid., para 119. 
101Ibid., para 120. 
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apply only to persons who are not already being detained.102 In addition, the 
Prosecution does not indicate how it is possible, under the legal framework 
provided for by the Statute and the Rules. 103 Regarding the situation of 
Ahmad Harun, he has a previous record of concealing evidence in this 
case104 and Sudanese authorities have publically stated that Sudan will not 
cooperate with the Court.105
Some commentators viewed the PTC’s approval of warrants for two 
suspects as a major step: for the first time, the Court especially the 
Prosecutor had managed to conduct investigations without cooperation from 
the state where the alleged crimes had been committed.
 Therefore, the Chamber is not satisfied that 
Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb will appear voluntarily before the Court and 
considers that the arrests of Ali Kushayb and Ahmad Harun  appear to be 
necessary at this stage pursuant to Art 58 (1) (b) of the Statute and therefore 
issued two arrest warrants.   
106 But the twenty-
month investigation and the naming of suspects that observers believed 
were not at top levels of the government showed both the independence of 
the Prosecutor and perhaps his caution.107
Following the issuance of the two arrest warrants, the Sudanese government 
refused to further engagement with the ICC. The reaction to the Harun case 
was indicative. In September 2007, the government placed him at the head 
of a committee to investigate violations of human rights in Darfur. It also 
  
                                               
102 Rule 119 of Procedure and Evidence reads “The Pre-Trial Chamber may set one or more 
conditions restricting liberty,including the following: (a) The person must not travel beyond 
territorial limits set by the Pre-Trial Chamber without the explicit agreement of the 
Chamber; (b) The person must not go to certain places or associate with certain persons as 
specified by the Pre-Trial Chamber; (c) The person must not contact directly or indirectly 
victims or witnesses; (d) The person must not engage in certain professional activities; (e) 
The person must reside at a particular address as specified by the Pre-Trial Chamber; (f) 
The person must respond when summoned by an authority or qualified person designated 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber; (g) The person must post bond or provide real or personal 
security or surety, for which the amount and the schedule and mode of payment shall be 
determined by the Pre-Trial Chamber; (h) The person must supply the Registrar with all 
identity documents, particularly his or her passport.” 
103 Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art 58 (7) of the Statute, PTC I, ICC-
02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007, para 121. 
104 Ibid., para 122. 
105 Ibid., para 123. 
106Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p.241. 
107Ibid., pp.241-242. 
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appointed him to a committee overseeing deployment of the combined UN 
and AU peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID).108
The Prosecutor reported, in his report to the Security Council in 2007, that 
he was investigating an ongoing pattern of crimes committed with the 
mobilization of the whole state apparatus and highlighted that “Ahmed 
Haroun is still allowed to play a role in this situation. As Minister of State 
for Humanitarian Affairs, he has been put in a position to control the 
livelihood and security of those people he displaced. The Government of 
Sudan has maintained him in this position with full knowledge of his past 
and present activities”.
  
109
4.3 The Risky Step-The Arrest Warrants 
against the Head of Sudan 
  The Sudanese authorities’ public opposition 
against the arrest warrants rendered the surrender of the two suspects of less 
possibility.  
In late 2007, the Prosecutor indicated to diplomats and UN officials that if 
Haroun and Kushayb were surrendered to the Court, he would not open a 
further investigation into the crimes the subject of those proceedings. In 
December 2007, he made it clear in his statement to the Security Council 
that he would go after the person responsible for protecting Haroun in 
particular, namely the person “who is maintaining Haroun in a position to 
commit crimes, who is instructing him. This is my second case.”110
4.3.1 The Arrest Warrant against the Head of Sudan 
  
With neither tangible progress on the ground nor in peace process, the 
Prosecutor changed his cautious stance. The drastic shift is the public 
application of arrest warrant against Sudanese sitting President Al-Bashir on 
                                               
108 Sudan Tribunal, “What Alternative to UNAMID Will Provide Security for Darfur?”, 31 
December 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/What-Alternative-to-UNAMID-Will,25286, 
retrieved on 25 April, 2011. 
109 Six Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 5 December 2007. 
110 Statement by Prosecutor of the ICC to UN Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 
(2005), 5 December 2007. 
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14 July 2008. Upon investigation of crimes allegedly committed in the 
territory of Darfur, the Prosecution applied to PTC I to issue the arrest 
warrant alleging that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (hereinafter “Al Bashir”) bears criminal 
responsibility for the crimes of genocide under Article 6 (a) of the Rome 
Statute, crimes against humanity under article 7 (1) of the Statute and war 
crimes under Article 8 (2)(e)(i)and Article 8 (2)(e)(v) of the Statute and Al 
Bashir “committed crimes through members of the state apparatus, the army 
and the Militia/Janjaweed in accordance with Article 25 (3) of the Statute 
(indirect perpetration or perpetration by means)”.111
The PTC I considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe that war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, throughout the Darfur region, were 
committed by governmental forces and Militias.
  
112 Since Al Bashir has been 
the de jure and de facto President of Sudan and Commander-in Chief of the 
Sudanese Armed Forces and in that position, he played an essential role in 
coordinating, with other high-ranking Sudanese political and military 
leaders, the design and implementation of the counter-insurgency campaign, 
the PTC I considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe he is 
criminally responsible as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-
perpetrator. 113  But the Majority of the Chamber observed that the 
Prosecution acknowledges that it has no direct evidence of the Sudanese 
Government’s genocidal intent114and decides not to include the counts of 
genocide. Accordingly, an arrest warrant against the sitting President Al 
Bashir (”Al Bashir arrest warrant”) was therefore issued by the PTC I with 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.115
                                               
111 Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 14 July 2008. The full text of the 
Application was not publicly available at the time of writing. An official summary is 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 Against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, available at: 
  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-
4E9C-A672-3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf 
112 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Al Bashir, 
ICC-02/05-01/09, PTC I, 4 March 2009. [’Decision on Al Bashir Arrest Warrant’] 
113 Decision on Al Bashir Arrest Warrant, p.7. 
114 Decision on Al Bashir Arrest Warrant, para. 202. 
115 Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No.: ICC-02/05-01/09-01, PTC I, 
4 March 2009. [’Al Bashir Arrest Warrant’] 
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4.3.2 The Reaction to Arrest Warrant 
The public announcement of the warrant brought about debates and 
criticism both within Sudan and around international community.  
Some western states such as US, UK  and France were in favour of the 
arrest warrant. Human rights groups hailed the ICC’s decision and human 
rights campaigners said the warrant for Bashir to go on trial would send a 
strong message about ending impunity and pressure the government to seek 
a swift and peaceful end to the six-year conflict in Darfur.116
The Government of Sudan reacted immediately expelling at least six foreign 
aid agencies hours after the arrest warrant was issued without any reason 
given for the move.
 
117 Some states and regional organizations considered 
the warrant would constitute a barrier to peace talks in the region. The 
African and Arabic states  warned that the court's action would only 
increase tension in Sudan. 118 African Union Commission Chairman Jean 
Ping said that peace and justice should not collide and that the need for 
justice should not override the need for peace.119
Some observers even argued that the Prosecutor’s choice to accuse a sitting 
head of state had complicated and weakened prospects for ICC fact-finding 
in Darfur. Al Bashir’s immediate expelling human rights NGOs and 
humanitarian agencies from Darfur dried up information sources, which are 
deemed of great importance for prospects of ICC fact-finding in Darfur.
  
120
                                               
116 Guardian: Sudanese president Bashir charged with Darfur war crimes, 4 March 2009, 
  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/04/omar-bashir-sudan-president-arrest. 
117 BBC News, Warrant Issued for Sudan’s Leader, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7923102.stm. retrived on 26 May 2011. 
118 Ibid. 
119 BC News, World reaction: Bashir warrant, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923797.stm, retrieved on 26 May 2011. 
120 Lyal S. Sunga: How can UN human rights special procedures sharpen ICC fact-finding? 
The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.15, No.2, February 2011, p.199. 
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4.3.3 Some Controversies of Al Bashir Arrest 
Warrant 
Among various claims against Al Bashir Arrest Warrant, some 
controversies in relation to the Prosecutor’s tactics in applying this 
warrantworth being singled out here. 
4.3.3.1 Why not to Target Other Senior Government 
Officials? 
Why didn’t the Prosecutor target other senior officials instead of indicting a 
sitting head of state? Does it make sense to issue a warrant of arrest when 
the President is still in office and can exercise control over governmental 
forces or would it be better to do so when he is no longer in power? It seems 
evident that a state led by a widely supported head will not easily cooperate 
with the ICC, not to mention when it wants to arrest him. After the 
announcement of the arrest warrant, thousands of government supporters 
gathered in Khartoum, chanting "We love you President Bashir", and ahead 
of the announcement, Al Bashir assertively said that the Hague tribunal 
could “eat” the arrest warrant and added that it would “not be worth the ink 
it is written on” and then danced for thousands of cheering supporters who 
burned an effigy of the ICC chief prosecutor. 121 In early years, Karadzic 
and Mladic did not have such national position but the patriotism permitted 
them to avoid being transferred to Hague. Most prosecutions of officials of a 
former regime occur after a transition to democracy, in the context of a new 
democratic government consolidating its power. Only two arrest warrants 
have been issued against serving heads of state-the former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor and former Yugoslavian President Slobodan 
Milosevic, but neither of them is an informative precedent for the Sudan 
case.122
                                               
121 BBC News, Warrant Issued for Sudan’s Leader,  
  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7923102.stm, retrieved on 26 May, 2011. 
122 Alex de Waal: ”A Critique of the Public Application by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
for an Arrest Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir”, Social Science Research 
Council, para 70. 
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4.3.3.2  Why not to Apply a Summons to Appear as 
Alternative? 
Compared with arrest warrant, a confrontational and stronger mandate for 
the arrest, a summons to appear is in effect a legal invitation to appear 
before a court with an expectation that a would-be suspect would be willing 
comply. The issuance of a summons to appear for a sitting president would 
be less confrontational than an arrest warrant.  Since most suspects indicted 
by the Prosecutor would be either senior government officials or leaders of 
rebel groups, by asking the PTC to issue a summons, the Prosecutor seeks to 
increase the chances of the suspects’ voluntary appearance before the Court 
so as to avoid legal confrontation and other unfriendly forcible measures. A 
summon could low the cost of cooperation between the Court and other 
parties concerned and even avoid some possible conflicts of interests among 
states. The ICC is a judicial institution which is not intent to create polical 
discomforts among states.  Regarding Al Bashir, upon the issuance of the 
arrest warrant, he was still an incumbent president of Sudan and could 
exercise his power over military mandates. A summons to appear seems to 
be more appropriate means to politely ‘invite’ this head of a state to The 
Hague, though practically no sitting head of state would voluntarily stand 
before a trial.   
Furthermore, given the fact that the first two arrest warrants are not 
executed and both Ali Kushayb and Ahmad Harun are still at large, it is not 
highly possible that the third warrant would be successfully executed. It 
should be asked why the Prosecutor, who has not yet succeeded in arresting 
the first two suspects, would engage himself in the pernicious and 
unrealistic direction. He should have predicted the particular difficulty and 
little possibility of execution of warrant when making this bold decision to 
arrest a serving president. This kind of strategy in the exercise of his 
mandate risks weakening his authority, especially at the initiate stage of the 
ICC’s life. 
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4.3.3.3 Why not a Sealed Warrant?  
Why did the Prosecutor make a public application instead of a sealed 
(confidential) warrant? Since a sealed warrant would likely have preserved 
the element of surprise, or at least uncertainty, and hence had a better 
chance to be executed. The commentator’s major argument for this point is 
the successful practice of sealed warrants in ICTY. In the ICC, it was 
practiced in the case of former Congo Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, 
who was arrested in Brussels in 2008 and transferred to The Hague. 
4.3.3.4 Why to Insist on the Genocide Charge in the 
Warrant? 
Among the three crimes charged, genocide is the most difficult to prove. 
The case law of prosecutions for genocide in ad hoc tribunals ICTY and 
ICTR, provide a relatively modest basis on which to build a robust 
prosecutorial strategy. For the success of charging genocide, the Prosecutor 
has to demonstrate three things: (i) the targeted groups qualified for 
protected status as “racial”, “ethnic” or “national” under Article 2 of 
Genocide Convention as well as Article 6 of the Rome Statute; (ii) the acts 
committed against these groups (actus reus) were of sufficient nature to 
warrant the categorization of “genocide” under the Genocide Convention 
and sufficient gravity to meet the admissibility criterion of the Rome 
Statute; (iii) the charged individual Al Bashir possessed the required 
genocidal intent (mens rea) that the perpetrator intended “to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such”.123 
Among the three124
                                               
123 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, ICJ, Judgment, 27 February 2007. [Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment], para 521. 
, the proof of genocide intent is always the most difficult 
to achieve especially in the phase of trial, it must withstand the test of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”.  
124 To demonstrate the three things, the proofs in the Prosecutor’s Application are 
problematic, see Alex de Waal: ’A Critique of the Public Application by the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICC for an Arrest Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir’, 
Social Science Research Council, paras 9-45. 
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When PTC I rejected the genocidal charge, the Prosecutor was not satisfied 
with the PTC’s decision and appealed.125
The Appeals Chamber pointed out that “[A] Pre-Trial Chamber acts 
erroneously if it denies to issue a warrant of arrest under article 58 (1) of the 
Statute on the basis that ‘the existence of …genocidal intent is only one of 
several reasonable conclusions available on the materials provided by the 
Prosecution’”.
  
126  Although the Majority of PTC I recognized that the 
applicable standard is one of “reasonable grounds to believe”, it did in fact 
apply a higher level of proof, one that can be identified only with the 
standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”. 127  In the view of the 
Appeals Chamber, “requiring that the existence of genocidal intent must be 
the only reasonable conclusion amounts to requiring the Prosecutor to 
disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to eliminate any reasonable 
doubt (…).” 128 Imposition of such a standard would be tantamount to the 
creation of an obligation on the part of the Prosecution to prove genocidal 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt, a “higher and more demanding” 129 
standard than the one required under article 58 (1)(a) of the Statute.130
                                               
125 Prosecution Document in Support of Appeal against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-
01/09-25, The Appeals Chamber, 6 July 2009. 
 The 
Appeals Chamber remanded to the PTC I for re-examination of the matter 
126 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, The Appeals 
Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, 3 February 2010, para 1. 
127 Prosecution Document in Support of Appeal against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, The Appeals 
Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA, 6 July 2009, para 1. 
128 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, The Appeals 
Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, 3 February 2010, para 33. 
129 Ibid., para 39. 
130 In accordance with the Rome Statute, trials at the ICC take three stages:1. the issuance 
of a warrant of arrest or summons to appear under article 58 of the Rome Statute; 2. the 
confirmation of the charges and committal of a person for trial under article 61 of the Rome 
Statute and; 3. the conviction of an accused person under article 66 of the Rome Statute. 
Significantly, different evidential standards must be at each stage of the trial and these are 
progressively higher. 1. At the stage of issuing an arrest warrant or a summons to appear, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber need only be 'satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person has commintted a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court'. (Article 58 
(1)(a)) 2. In constrast, when deciding whether or not to confirm the charges, the Chamber 
must determine whether there is 'sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed the crime charged'. (Article 61(7)) 3. Finally, at the trial 
stage, the Trial Chamber must 'be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable 
doubt' in order to convict an accused. (Article 66(3)). 
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on the application of the standard of proof-namely, in relation to Al Bashir’s 
genocidal intent.131 On the basis of the evidentiary standard identified by the 
Appeals Chamber, the PTC I accepted that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that Omar Al Bashir acted with dolus specialis/specific intent to 
destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic group and 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the material elements, common 
and specific, of each of the alleged counts of genocide were fulfilled and 
decided to issue the second warrant of arrest against Al Bashir132 for his 
alleged criminal responsibility under article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute for 
genocide by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately 
inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
the group’s physical destruction within the meaning of Article 6 (a) (b) (c) 
of the Statute, respectively.133
However, even if the genocidal charge could be approved by PTC in issuing 
the second arrest warrant, the Prosecutor still would have to experience the 
test of standard of beyond a reasonable doubt during the phase of trial if Al 
Bashir appeare in The Hague and face the trial.  
  
4.3.3.5 Why to Pursue A New Mode of Liability? 
In the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, the modes of liability frequently used 
are joint criminal enterprise or common purpose liability as well as 
command and superior responsibility. But in the application of Al Bashir 
Warrant, instead of arguing for these common-used modes, the Prosecutor 
pursued an ambitious and innovative mode of liability: indirect perpetration 
or ”perpetration by means”, by stating that Al Bashir “committed crimes 
through members of the state apparatus, the army and the Militia/Janjaweed 
in accordance with Article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute (indirect perpetration or 
                                               
131 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, The Appeals 
Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, 3 February 2010, para 42. 
132 Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-95, 
PTC I, 12 July 2010. 
133 Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-
01/09, PTC I, 12 July 2010, p. 28. 
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perpetration by means)”. 134  This is deemed as “a bold precedent in 
prosecutorial strategy and a departure from the previous indictment”, 135
The reason why prosecutors usually preferred “common purpose” liability, 
including conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise is precisely because it is 
much easier to prove guilt in this way, inferring responsibility from 
involvement in an organization which has committed crimes in a systematic 
fashion. The avenue of superior or command responsibility also allows for 
prosecution on the basis that the accused should have known that a crime 
was going to be committed but took no steps to prevent it, or failed to 
punish crimes he knew had been committed.  
 
since it has to date not been used before international criminal tribunals.  
By contrast, proving that Al Bashir committed the crimes as an indirect 
perpetrator in the way that the Prosecutor has employed, it is considerably 
harder to prove that an individual intended a specific crime and directly 
instructed others to commit on his behalf. This is especially the case for 
genocide, for which proof of intent is all-important. OTP outlined three 
elements of this mode of liability: (i) it requires proof that the perpetrator is 
able to impose his will over the direct perpetrator; (ii) in the case of 
perpetration through an organization or group, that organization or group 
must be structured in a way that it responds to the demand of an individual, 
and the individual in question- the indirect perpetrator-must possess 
sufficient authority to be able to enforce his will; (iii) the indirect perpetrator 
must be aware of his role and use it in order to commit the crimes.136
                                               
134 Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 14 July 2008. The full text of the 
Application was not publicly available at the time of writing. An official summary is 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 Against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-
4E9C-A672-3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf.  
 By 
constructing this novel form of liability, the Prosecutor entered a legal 
territory with so few precedents. Establishment of legal precedent demands 
135Alex de Waal, ’A Critique of the Public Application by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
for an Arrest Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir’, Social Science Research 
Council, para 51. 
136 Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 14 July 2008. para 248, see Alex de 
Waal: A Critique of the Public Application by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC for an Arrest 
Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, Social Science Research Council, para 
53. 
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not only courage but also wisdom. But the prospects of this innovation are 
bleak.  
Some commentators concluded that, for genocide charge, Al Bashir would 
most probably fail to obtain a conviction and would be acquitted; and for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity using the mode of liability 
“perpetration by means”, he would also face a high likelihood of failing to 
obtain a conviction.137
Given the above controversies and difficulties, a less confrontational and 
potentially more productive option some argued for might have been to 
indict other lower-ranking but still senior officials for easier-to-prove 
atrocity crimes. Had such application, and any resulting warrant, been 
sealed, there may have been a greater chance of arresting the alleged 
perpetrator, without giving the credence to the claims of those who asserted 
that the ICC’s objective was not justice but regime change. This approach 
would have reduced the risks of a public dispute with the AU and some 
African states that are parties to the Rome Statute and are disturbed by mass 
atrocities perpetrated by government supported militias in Sudan and thus 
support the prosecution of African responsible for atrocity crimes.
  
138
4.4 The Prosecutor’s Approach Outside the 
Courtroom 
  
4.4.1 From Conservative to Confrontational 
From the above activities that have been carried out by the Prosecutor and 
his Office, it is not difficult to draw out a clear line of the Prosector’s stance 
changing from conservative to confrontational. At the very beginning 
immediately after the Security Council’s referral, he was very cautious in 
particular in the initial investigation where his slow pace annoyed the PTC I 
and judges implicitly pressured him by invitation of two amicus curiae. 
                                               
137Alex de Waal: A Critique of the Public Application by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
for an Arrest Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, Social Science Research 
Council , paras 88-89. 
138 Crisis Group Africa Report N 152, ”Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC” , 17 July 2009. 
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Perhaps hastened by the PTC I and the peer review by two experts, with the 
progress of the investigation and identification of suspects, he applied two 
summonses to appear and PTC I authorized two arrest warrants instead for 
the reason of ensuring their appearance before the Court. After that, due to 
the non-execution of the first two warrants and the defiant Government of 
Sudan, the Prosecutor made a bold and possibly risky step -applying a 
public arrest warrant against the incumbent Sudanese President Al Bashir. 
This is the landmark event in the judicial side of conflict resolution in 
Darfur region which surged worldwide attention and debates.   
The Prosecutor’s changing stance could also be observed in his Reports and 
statements to the Security Council. In the earlier reports, he refrained from 
criticizing the Government of Sudan, even though it had provided little 
cooperation in the beginning. Beyond that, he generously gave prominence 
to the limited assistance that the GoS had provided, crediting it with a 
measure of cooperation, such as providing to his Office information relating 
to the Sudanese legal system, as well as information relating to traditional 
processes for reconciliation relevant to Darfur,139 allowing unfettered access 
to the requested officials in meetings that were formally video recorded.140 
The wording of the Prosecutor at that time was complimentary and it was 
expected that the Government of Sudan may continue to cooperate with the 
Court along the line. From the Fourth Report, however, his began to 
evaluate the attitude of governmental authorities more objectively with the 
wording of narritive-“The Government of the Sudan has also provided a 
limited amount of the documentation requested by the Office”, 141  and 
pointed out the rejection of request to question Ahmad Harun and Ali 
Kushayb,142
                                               
139 First Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) . 
 In the Sixth Report, after the issuance of the first two arrest 
warrants against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb,  the Prosecutor publically 
140 Third Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) . 
141 Fourth Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) . 
142 Fifth Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) . 
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stated “that degree of cooperation no longer exist”143 and the Government of 
Sudan has chosen to protect Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb instead of 
ensuring arresting them. 144 The Sudanese Government was in a position not 
only to cooperate in the arrest of Ahmad Harun but to break this system and 
contribute to halting crimes.145 Until the recent Reports, the Prosecutor all 
the more bluntly criticized the non-cooperation of Sudan. 146
Given pervasive culture of impunity which has worsened conflict in Darfur, 
the Prosecutor’s decision to issue the arrest warrant against Al Bashir is a 
heavy blow towards the impunity. But the ICC and in particular the 
Prosecutor is in a difficult position, as it has no capacity to execute its 
decisions independently. The manner in which the Prosecutor has sought to 
bring first Haroun and Kushayb and then Bashir to justice has risked 
politicizing his office and threatening to authority and credibility of the 
Court. But why did the Prosecutor take that confrontational and risky step 
apparently different from his conservative stance during the initial stage of 
investigation? The arrest warrant against Al Bashir not only suffered from 
wide criticism against the Prosecutor and the Court, but also resulted in a 
deadlock of this judicial process.  
  
4.4.2 The Analysis of the Prosecutor’s Approach 
Regarding the activities outside the courtroom, on one hand, to fulfill 
effective investigation, identification of suspects and surrender of them, the 
Prosecutor, with the existing resources of the OTP, has to seek state 
cooperation and other backing from international community and make 
extensive use of external resources. What approach the Prosecutor will 
employ largely depends on availability of the cooperation and support from 
outside so as to advance the judicial process. On the other hand, the 
                                               
143 Sixth Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), para 22. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., para 23. 
146 Eleventh Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), para. 60. 
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Prosecutor’s approach will also affect the availability of such cooperation 
and support in subsequent process.  
Among the potential cooperation and possible support that the Prosecutor 
could resort to, the Government of Sudan, the regional organization African 
Union and the referring organ UN Security Council would be the most 
possible options. 
4.4.2.1 The Government of Sudan 
The State in relation to the situation, in theory, should be the priority for the 
Prosecutor to seek for cooperation, although such state usually is hostile to 
the mandate of the ICC.  
The Prosecutor’s reliance on Government of Sudan was at least three-fold. 
First, he must cooperate with the government, bearing in mind with the 
principle of complementarity, to assess whether the domestic judicial 
proceedings are genuinely able or willing to prosecute relevant international 
crimes being pursued by the ICC; secondly, he must obtain cooperation 
from the government to conduct investigation in the field, for consideration 
of effective investigation such as providing evidence, and concerns of 
security of witness and victims; thirdly, he must maintain close relationship 
with the government for the purpose of handing over suspects to The Hague. 
At the early phase, the Prosecutor attempted to obtain trust and cooperation 
of the Sudanese government. This was explicitly expressed in his early 
reports and statements to the Security Council about his generous outline of 
Sudanese Government’s very limited cooperation which has already been 
mentioned above. Beyond this, he also gave some assurance by clarifying 
some speculation around the content of the list of 51 names prepared by the 
Darfur Commission and the status of that list in relation to the investigations 
being carried out by the OTP. He stated that the list was opened and 
resealed in the presence of the OTP Executive Committee and remained 
sealed at that time. In order to convince the Sudanese authorities, he 
reiterated that the list just presented the conclusion of the Darfur 
Commission and was in no way binding on the Prosecutor and the activities 
and objectives of the Darfur Commission are entirely distinct from the work 
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of the OTP in implementing Resolution 1593 (2005). 147
However, the Prosecutor’s compliment and assurance did not effectuate. 
With the progress in the field and proceedings in the Court, Sudan  
presented its stiff stance by sheltering the suspects indicted by the 
Prosecutor and no longer cooperated with the ICC in any sense. Faced with 
consistent defiance of Sudanese Government, he explicitly criticized its non-
cooperation and even resistance to the ICC. A public, unsealed warrant with 
charge of a gravest crime was the strongest signal sent to the Sudanese 
authorities that indicated his determination and decision. No matter carrot 
first or stick later, what the Prosecutor did was to seek cooperation from the 
government, albeit neither worked well. 
  And his 
conservative approach and reluctance to establish field presence inside 
Darfur in the initial stage of investigation was largely aimed to obtain 
cooperation as much as possible. A less offensive tactic usually is supposed 
to be more effective and flexible. 
4.4.2.2 Afrian Union 
AU is a significant regional organization which is always committed to 
solve regional conflicts and in Darfur crisis, it is also a key actor that makes 
substantial contributes to peacekeeping and peace negotiations. AU founded 
a peacekeeping force in 2004-African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)-to 
operating primarily in the western region of Darfur with the aim of 
performing peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. AMIS 
was the only external military force in Sudan’s Darfur region until UN-
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established. A more 
sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for 
September 2006, but it was not implemented at that time due to Sudanese 
government’s opposition. The mandate of AMIS was extend repeatedly 
throughout 2006, while the situation in Darfur continued to escalate, until 
AMIS was finally replaced by UNAMID in 2007.  
                                               
147 Second Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 13 December 2005, p. 3. 
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In the Resolution 1593, paragraph 3 clearly invites the ICC and the AU to 
discuss practical arrangement that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor 
and of the Court. To a certain extent, AU is supposed to play a crucial role 
in conflict solution no matter in political process or enforcement of judicial 
decision. Particularly for the execution of arrest warrants, AU is expected to 
be a key actor which coordinates enforcement affairs in the region 
especially when Sudanese Government is obstructive to the orders of the 
ICC.  
After the announcement of arrest warrant against Al Bashir, AU responded 
quickly and requested the UN Security Council to defer the proceedings 
initiated against President Al Bahsir in accordance with Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute. Regrettably, such request had neither been heard nor acted 
upon. Besides reiterating its deferral request to the Security Council, it 
adopted a decision148 which announced its non-cooperation policy with the 
ICC. In the decision, it expressed its deep concern at the indictment issued 
by the PTC against President Al Bashir,149 noted with grave concern that the 
indictment had unfortunate consequences on the delicate peace processes 
underway in the Sudan and it would continue to undermine the ongoing 
efforts aimed at facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur.150 
It decided that, in view of the fact that the request by the AU for deferral of 
the proceedings before the Court had never been acted upon, “the AU 
member states shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for arrest and surrender 
of President Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan”151 AU and its member states 
reserve the right to take any further decisions or measures that may be 
deemed necessary in order to preserve and safeguard the dignity, 
sovereignty and integrity of the continent.152
The AU’s non-cooperation policy not only heavily marginalized the judicial 
solution of Darfur crisis dominated by the ICC but also weakened the 
  
                                               
148 Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), 3 July 2009. 
149 Ibid., para 2. 
150 Ibid., para 3. 
151 Ibid., para 10. 
152 Ibid., para 12 
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backing from the continent which is supposed to be significant to enforce 
the Court’s decision.  
4.4.2.3 The Security Council 
4.4.2.3.1 The Legal Framework of the Secirity Council’s Action 
When the situation was referred to the Security Council, most commentators 
deemed it as a great breakthrough as they believed the Courts action can be 
backed up by the Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms in case the relevant 
states fail to live up to their obligation to cooperate with the Court. 153 
Against such failure, the Court was normally equipped with enforcement 
measures provided for in Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute, once the 
Security Council has referred a situation, any refusal or lack of cooperation 
can trigger its entire enforcement machinery (including adoption of 
sanction). 154  And since the Security Council acts under authorization of 
Chapter VII of the Charter, it is natural that the Council would be the most 
solid back-up of the Court. When the Darfur Commission recommended the 
Security Council to refer the situation, it pointed out that “only the authority 
of the ICC, backed up by that of the United Nations Security Council, might 
compel both leading personalities in the Sudanese Government and the 
heads of rebels to submit to investigation and possibly criminal 
proceedings.”155
But such expectation seems to be over-optimistic. The position of the 
Security Council on Darfur situation before and after is not consistent. After 
the referral in 2005, the Security Council regularly adopted the resolutions 
of Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan dealing with the issues but 
 The Security Council’s potential guarantee is one of the 
major reasons that the Darfur Commission considered the referral was best 
way of accountability. 
                                               
153 Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems? Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (2006), p. 436. 
154 Article87 (7) provides that “Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to 
cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the 
Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a 
finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the 
Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.” 
155 Report of Darfur Commission, para 572. 
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it was not so active on the judicial solution of the crisis. It had adopted 
several resolutions under Chapter VII calling for Khartoum to disarm the 
Janjaweed and end the violence, but no meaningful sanctions were imposed 
for non-compliance or explicitly linked to future compliance.156
For example, in 2009, after the issuance of Al Bashir arrest warrant, there 
were altogether three resolutions (1870, 1881,1891)
 After the 
issuance of the arrest warrants and particularly the arrest warrant against Al 
Bashir, no resolution echoed them and rendered forcible backing for 
execution of the warrants.  
157 adopted dealing with 
Sudan-they were three Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. Only 
in resolution 1881, the most recent resolution after the warrant, it 
“emphasizing the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and 
urging the Government of Sudan to comply with its obligations in this 
respect”,158
In the Resolution 1935
 but did not mention any word of the criminal proceedings in the 
Court, in particular the warrant against Al Bashir. No text dealing with the 
judicial solution of Darfur crisis appeared in the other two resolutions.  
159 which was adopted on 30 July 2010, more than 
one year after Al Bashir warrant, except simply repeating “emphasizing the 
need to bring to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and urging the 
Government of Sudan to comply with its obligations in this respect”, no 
substantial content covered the compliance with judicial decisions. 
Resolution 1945160
4.4.2.3.2 The Prosecutor’s Failure to Seek Support from the 
Security Council 
 of 2010 did not mention either.  
If one argued that at the early time the Prosecutor preferred working 
independently from the Security Council’s authority though he could rely on 
                                               
156 Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 22 (2009), p.118. 
157UNSC Res 1870 (20 May 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1870, UNSC Res 1881(6 August 2009) 
UN Doc S/RES/1881, UN Res 1891(13 October) UN Doc S/RES/1891. 
158 UNSC Res 1881(6 August 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1881. 
159 UNSC Res 1935 (30 July 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1935.  
160 UNSC Res 1945 (14 October, 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1945.  
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it,161 then, after the announcement of Al Bashir arrest warrant, confronted 
by the Sudanese Government’s strong opposition and AU’s non-cooperation 
policy, he turned to the Security Council which is supposed to be the last but 
strongest backing. In the Ninth Report to the Security Council, the 
Prosecutor reminded that “the Security Council might find it timely to start 
work on defining a framework to assist in the implementation of UNSC 
1593 and the judicial decisions which have followed in relation to Darfur, 
and to enhance the cooperation of all parties concerned.” 162 In his Tenth 
Report to the Security Council, in the section titled “cooperation including 
for the enforcement of arrest warrants”, the Prosecutor repeated the 
paragraphs of Resolution 1593 and Presidential Statement 21 stating legal 
obligation of Sudanese Government and all parties to the conflict to 
cooperate with the Court and pointed out that Government of Sudan had the 
primary responsibility. 163  In addition, he encouraged other States to 
cooperate with the Court to execute the arrest warrants and expressed that he 
was grateful for the actions taken by States to respect their legal obligations 
and follow those guidelines.164 He also credited commends to AU and some 
states, Chad, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, Gambia and Mexico 
and EU. 165
In his Eleventh Report, when stating that the Government of Sudan has the 
primary responsibility and is fully able to implement the warrants with no 
external interference but it failed to do so,
In the two reports, the Prosecutor still expected the Security 
Council would work with the Court for enforcement of the arrest warrants 
and assumed that the Security Council should render some support even 
without any request.  
166
                                               
161 He did not accept Professor Antonio Cassese’s advise of reporting the government’s 
non-cooperation to the Security Council. 
 he referred to his address to the 
Security Council in December 2009 that he would deal with all judicial 
challenge brought by President Al Bashir and other suspects in Court but he 
162 Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 5 June 2009, para 75. 
163 Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 5 June 2009, para 62-63. 
164 Ibid., paras 64-65. 
165 Ibid., paras 67-71. 
166 Eleventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005),  para 60. 
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will need the full support of the Council. He even precisely sketched how 
the Security Council could do:  
“the UNSC can act upon UNSC 1593 and Presidential Statement 21 to 
secure the cooperation for the arrest of Ali Kushayb and Ahmad Harun. The 
Prosecution understands that the Council can accomplish this under various 
mechanisms including the existing UNSCR 1591 regime. UNSCR 1591, 
para 3(c) provides for application of these measures to individuals “who 
(…) commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or 
other atrocities.”  The UNSCR 1591 regime has already been put into 
practice through UNSCR 1672, which added four names of individuals to be 
subject to the measures set out in UNSCR 1591, namely freezing all funds, 
other financial assets and economic  resources owned or controlled by the 
individuals in question.”167
Moreover, besides pointing out that the legal framework for cooperation 
established by the Security Council through Resolution 1593 and 
Presidential Statement 21 is clear,
  
168 the Prosecutor cited the case of ICTY 
as a precedent, where Presidential Statement of August 8, 1996 raised the 
prospects of economic sanctions in the event of continued non-compliance 
with the orders of the ICTY. In Resolution 1088 (1996), the Security  
Council threatened to discontinue international financial aid in the face of 
lack of compliance with the Tribunal’s order. 169
The Security Council’s inaction in Darfur affairs can be apparently 
compared with its clearly strong position in the most recent situation in 
Libya. As the second referral to the Prosecutor by the Council, it acted more 
actively than it did in Darfur. No more than one month after the referral, it 
 The Prosecutor, by 
recalling the action of the Security Council at the time of ICTY, aimed to 
enhance some prospects of support and implied the Security Council to take 
some similar measures for the enforcement of the arrest warrants. 
Unfortunately, such reminder and explicit request had not been echoed by 
the Security Council. 
                                               
167 Eleventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), para 63. 
168 Ibid., para 65. 
169 Ibid., para 64. 
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adopted Resolution 1973, approving “no-fly zone” over Libya and 
authorizing “all necessary measures” to protect civilians.170
Given the inaction and even indifference of the Security Council as well as 
the inherent flaws in the Resolution 1593 which has been analyzed in 
Chapter II, it appears to be legally paradoxical that the Security Council, on 
one hand, referred the situation in Darfur to the Court, and on the other 
hand, cut the funds, blurred its authorization and reacted passively to the 
Prosecutor’s request for support. Its unwillingness to authorize enforcement 
is incompatible with the referral because it cannot simultaneously subject 
the government to criminal scrutiny and non-coercively seek its cooperation 
and compliance. Of course, what seems hardly conceivable from the 
perspective of law and logic may be perfectly explained in terms of 
politics.
  The Resolution 
1973 was adopted no more than one month after the referring Resolution 
1970 of 26 February 2011. This is the drastic contrast with its inaction in 
Darfur crisis. It can be predicted that, if the Prosecutor decided to indict 
Omar Mouammer al Gaddafi and the PTC approved the arrest warrant 
against this Libyan leader, it would be likely that the Security Council take 
some necessary measures even sanction if Libyan government did not 
cooperate with the Court in arresting Gaddafi.  
171
4.4.3 Some Reflections on the Prosecutor’s 
Approach Outside the Courtroom 
 The referral by the Security Council, like the creation of ICTY in 
the early phase of the Bosnian war, created a criminal justice process 
unaccompanied by enforcement actions against behavior deemed to be 
criminal. The Prosecutor, upon receiving the situation in Darfur referred by 
the Security Council, may have been handling a task which is bound to fail.  
In dealing with the situation in Darfur referred by the Security Council, the 
Prosecutor seemed to move forward under skepticism and criticisms from 
                                               
170 UNSC Res 1973(17 March 2011), UN Doc S/RES/1973. 
171Luigi Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi, Comments on the Security Council Referral of 
the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005),  p. 
593. 
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all around: the PTC, the experts who have similar professional background 
and expertise with him, the state concerned, civil society organizations and 
others. The  critical voice achieved to the summit when he applied Al Bashir 
arrest warrant. While perhaps it held true that the prosecutorial strategy 
suggested that the Prosecutor is not only gambling with the future of Sudan, 
but with the future of the ICC as well,172
First, at the initial stage of investigation, the PTC I was not satisfied with 
the Prosecutor’s slow pace and lit a fire between PTC and OTP by inviting 
two amicus curiae to submit their observations on the investigative strategy 
the Prosecutor employed. However, the mandate of the ICC is to punish the 
perpetrators who have committed grave crimes and prevent future 
commission of such crimes but not to make political discomfort or 
diplomatic chaos between states concerned and the court. What’s more, 
given the fact that the state concerned is not a party to the Rome Statute and 
it is potentially hostile to the ICC , the Prosecutor had to adopt a diplomatic 
and flexible strategy rather than a aggressive one in particular at the early 
phase of investigation. 
 bearing in mind with complex non-
legal factors, some observations could be summed up in the following 
aspects to assuage his fault. 
Though Cassese suggested in his observation that the Prosecutor should 
have reported the refusal and non-cooperation of Sudanese authorities, if 
any, to the Security Council,173
Secondly, regarding the claim that the Prosecutor should have accused other 
senior officials instead of a sitting President, he probably made the decision 
on basis of practice of solution of other conflicts. The recent history shows 
that stigmatizing and marginalizing leaders who are under warrant for arrest 
 taking such advice may not contribute to 
improvement of investigation considering the indifference of the Security 
Council. The only benefit for the Prosecutor to follow this piece of advice is 
to transfer the fault to the Security Council so as to avoid criticism directly 
against himself. 
                                               
172 Alex de Waal, ’A Critique of the Public Application by the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
for an Arrest Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir’, Social Science Research 
Council, para 94. 
173 Cassese Observation, p. 6,10, also see Antonio Cassess, ’Is the ICC Still Having 
Teething Problems?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4 (2006), p.439. 
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can strengthen peace processes. The arrest warrants against Charles Taylor 
of Liberia and Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia and Herzegovina removed them 
from peace processes and ultimately facilitated the reaching of agreements. 
In addition, many credit the ICC warrants against the leaders of the Lord's 
Resistance Army in Uganda for their willingness to participate in peace 
talks for the first time in years.174
Thirdly, it is possible that the Prosecutor’s seeking of a public application of 
the arrest warrant instead of a sealed summons to appear is to pursue the 
effect of public advocacy, though such attempt is risky. When confronted 
with stiffer Government of Sudan and indifference of the Security Council, 
a sealed summons to appear or even a sealed arrest warrrant would not 
necessarily have the supposed elements of suprise and uncertainty, while a 
more aggressive public arrest warrant, to a certain extent, could send a 
message that the ICC dare to prosecute a serving president of the state and it 
is speculated that the Prosecutor attempted to resort to assertive means to 
call for serious concerns from the whole international community.  
 But for the situation in Darfur, Al Bashir 
has not been committed in the peace negotiation and peace process has 
already been fragile and trapped in stalemate even if no warrant against him 
was issued. What’s more, Al Bashir can exert influence over his Party and 
armed force and openly opposed the Court’s decisions, eg., after the PTC I 
issued the arrest warrant against Haroun, Al Bashir still allowed him to play 
a role in the government ministry. Removing Bashir from power status 
seems to be the only way for the ultimate solution of Darfur conflict. 
Moreover, a sealed indictment in fact is not always useful. At the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone, Liberian President Charles Taylor was the subject of 
a sealed indictment but it never helped to arrest Charles Taylors. The utility 
of the practice seemed marginal at best.175
                                               
174 Human Rights Watch: Q&A: International Criminal Court ’s Action Against Al Bashir, 
 At the ICC, in the situation in 
Uganda, the practice of sealed arrest warrant seemed not so effective, either. 
The Prosecutor applied for five sealed arrest warrants. Yet, more than one 
year after the unsealing, none of the warrants had been executed. At the time 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/02/q-international-criminal-court-s-action-against-al-
bashir,. 
175 William A. Schabas, supra note 14, p.184. 
 62 
of writing, except the decision of PTC II to terminate the proceedings 
against Raska Lukwiya, the warrant of arrest is rendered without effect and 
the other four accused are still at large.  
Regarding the situation in Darfur, the posture of Sudanese authorities, the 
worsening of the situation in Darfur and inaction of the whole international 
community clearly indicate that the ICC’s decision does not yet have a 
surprising effect. There actually seems no significant difference between a 
sealed warrant and a public one. A public indictment against a sitting leader 
probably was the last chance to which the Prosecutor could resort to move 
proceedings forward when external resources have been almost exhausted. 
Fourthly, the Prosecutor’s characteration of crimes in Darfur as genocide 
has some other possible consequences which could explain why he insisted 
this charge even if it is extremely difficult to establish. Under Article 1 of 
the Genocide Convention, all state parties are obliged to prevent and punish 
the crime of genocide. As interpreted by the International Court of Justice in 
the Bosnian Genocide case, 176  the obligation to prevent genocide is not 
limited to the state’s own territory.177 The obligation is incumbent on all 
states, and it requires them to exercise due diligence and “employ all means 
reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as 
possible.” 178 A State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to 
act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have 
learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be 
committed.179
                                               
176 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Judgment, 27 February 2007, [Genocide Judgment]. 
 Though genocide charge is particularly difficult to prove, at 
the minimum, an arrest warrant with genocide charge can oblige all state 
parties to the Genocide Convention to respond to the decision of the ICC on 
the legal basis of Genocide Convention even if they find no obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC flowing from the Rome Statute or Resolution 1593. 
Roughly 140 states have ratified or acceded to the Genocide Convention. In 
particular, on October 13, 2003, Sudan deposited instruments of accession 
to the Genocide Convention with the United Nations and the Genocide 
177 Genocide Judgment, para 183. 
178 Genocide Judgment, para 430. 
179 Genocide Judgment, para 431. 
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Convention entered into force for Sudan on 11 January 2004.180
                                               
180 List of parties to the Genocide Convention, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_Genocide_Convention ,  
 Hence, in 
addition to cooperation obligation arising from the Resolution 1593, the 
Genocide Convention provides another guarantee even if Sudan does not 
accede to the Rome Statute.  
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5 The Prosecutor’s Performance 
In the Courtroom 
5.1 Failure of Confirmation of Charges in Abu 
Garda Case 
Sooner after the warrant against the President Al Bashir, the PTC issued a 
summons to appear under seal against a senior member of the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), Abu Garda,181 in relation to commanding about 
1000 men to attack international peacekeepers and killing twelve African 
Union peacekeepers in Haskanita in 2007. Ten days later, the summons was 
unsealed. PTC I held that he committed three war crimes: violence to life 
under article 8 (2) (c)(i) and 25 (3) (a) and/or (f) of the Statute (Count 1), 
intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units 
and vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission under article 8 (2) (e) (iii) 
and 25 (3) (a) of the Statute (Count 2) and pillaging under article 8 (2) (e) 
(v) and 25 (3) (a) of the Statute (Count 3).182 Abu Garda is alleged that he is 
individually criminally responsible as a co-perpetrator or as an indirect co-
perpetrator for the counts of war crimes.183
Some day after the unsealing, Abu Garda appeared voluntarily before the 
Court. Abu Garda was the first person to appear voluntarily before the ICC. 
The rebel chief agreed to surrender himself voluntarily to face the charges 
saying he is confident of his innocence.
  
184
Promptly upon arriving at the Court, Abu Garda would be heard before the 
PTC, in the presence of the Prosecutor for confirmation of charges in 
   
                                               
181 Summons to Appear for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-2, PTC I, 7 May 
2009. 
182 ICC, Counts:http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/Related+Cases/I
CC02050209/ICC02050209.htm,  
183 Ibid. 
184Sudan Tribunal: ICC Prosecutor to Appeal Ruling Against Darfur Rebel,  
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=34151,. 
 65 
accordance with Article 61 of the Statute. Article 61 (1) specifies that the 
confirmation hearing “shall be held in the presence of the Prosecutor and the 
person charged, as well as his or her counsel”. But a confirmation hearing is 
not a trial.  
On 8 February 2010, in the confirmation of charges, PTC I dismissed the 
charges of prosecution. In the “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges”, 
PTC I found that the evidence brought by the Prosecution was not sufficient 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspect could be held 
criminally responsible for the crimes charged by the Prosecution 185  and 
hence refused to confirm the charges against Abu Garda, The Prosecutor 
applied for leave to appeal the “Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges”.186 The Prosecution argued that the Chamber wrongly discounted 
evidence, applied an incorrect legal test in its evalution of the evidence of 
Abu Garda’s authority and control over the group that carried out attacked  
in Haskanita and ignored critical factual allegations and evidence 
concerning events during the immediate aftermath of the attack. 187  It  
submitted that the evidence it has presented, when assessed under the 
correct standard, already suffices to justify confirmation.188
On 23 April 2010, PTC I rejected the Prosecutor’s application for leave to 
appeal the decision on confirm charges against Abu Garda. It held that the 
alleged issue amounts to a mere disagreement with the findings of the 
Chamber, stemming from the exercise of its discretionary powers to freely 
assess the evidence submitted by the Prosecution for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing and such disagreement does not amount to an issue 
under Article 82 (1)(d).
   
189
                                               
185 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, PTC I, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 February 
2010, paras 231-233. 
  Hence, all charges against Abu Garda were 
dismissed. But in accordance with Article 61 (8) of the Rome Staute, the 
decision does not preclude the prosecution from subsequently requesting 
186 Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges”, ICC-02/05-02/09-252-Red, PTC I, 15 March 2010. 
187Ibid., para 1. 
188 Ibid., para 2. 
189 Decision on the "Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the 'Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges'", PTC I, 23 April 2010, para 25. 
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confirmation of the charges if such a request is supported by additional 
evidence.    
Judge Cuno Tarfusser gave his separate opinion on the ”Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges”. He dissociated himself in several respects from 
the reasoning developed by the Majority. Regarding the Prosecutor’s 
assessment of evidence, he pointed out that “the lacunae and shortcomings 
exposed by the mere factual assessment of the evidence are so basic and 
fundamental that the Chamber need not conduct a detailed analysis of the 
legal issues pertaining to the merits of the case, in particular as to the 
existence of the material elements constituting any of the crimes 
charged.” 190
The findings of PTC and the separate opinion are surely damaging for the 
Prosecutor. Some commentator is view of that “it is not just another setback 
for Chief Prosecutor. It is an astonishing tale of incoherence, inconsistency 
and poor legal practice, surely unprecedented in a court of this stature” and 
even doubted his capacity to lead the OTP, already so damaged by his 
tenure.
  
191
5.2 Reflection on the Procedure of 
Confirmation of Charges 
  
The procedure of confirmation of charges has no equivalent in national legal 
systems. Establishment of the confirmation hearing within the procedural 
architecture of the Rome Statute is an important example of the increased 
judicial control by the judiciary over the Prosecutor that sets the ICC apart 
from other international criminal justice institutions.192 According to PTC I, 
in the first confirmation hearing, the purpose of the confirmation hearing is 
to protect the defendant against abusive and unfounded accusations.193
                                               
190 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, p. 
99. 
  
191 The Abu Garda Case and the OTP, http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2010/02/09/the-abu-
garda-case-and-the-otp/,. 
192 M. Cherif Bassiouni (eds.), The Statute of the International Criminal Court, A 
Documentary History, (Transnational Publisher, 1998), p.735. 
193 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case  No.ICC-01/04-01/06. 
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The proceeding requirements of confirmation of charges are laid down in 
Article 61 of the Statute. According to this article, within a reasonable time 
after the accused person’s appearance before the Court, the PTC must hold a 
hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial. 
At the hearing, which must be held in the presence of the Prosecutor, the 
accused and his or her counsel, the PTC has to be satisfied that there are 
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crimes with 
which he or she is charged. In the 1996 session of the Preparatory 
Commission of Rome Statute, some delegations feared that, without some 
degree of judicial intervention and assistance, an accused would be de facto 
precluded from collecting evidence essential to the preparation of his or her 
defense.194
From the perspective of right to a fair trial, the confirmation of charges 
provides the accused with procedural guarantee of a certain degree. 
Nevertheless, ICTY former Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour took a critical 
view on this procedure. In her view, such provision “permitted judges to call 
on the Prosecutor to seek a public reconfirmation of indictments for the 
purpose of issuing international arrest warrants when arrests had not yet 
been effected. The benefit of this process was obviously to satisfy the 
appetite of the press for access to the investigative phase of the work of the 
Tribunal-a phase not typically conducted in public. In turn, the process led 
to the increased visibility of the Tribunal, and provided a forum to mobilize 
public opinion in favor of aggressive arrest initiatives and budgetary 
support. ”
  
195
                                               
194 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.236-237. 
 But she personally does not know if recourse to this provision 
was either necessary or effective for this purpose. On the other hand, she 
believed that recourse to this provision was detrimental to the work of the 
Prosecutor and she was never persuaded that its benefits outweighed its 
deleterious effects. It monopolized important and scarce resources within 
OTP with investigators and prosecutors re-examining the case for hearing 
preparation rather than moving on to developing new cases and it also gave 
195 Louise Abour, ’The Crucial Years’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 
p.399. 
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the trial attorneys a false sense of security and confidence in the quality of 
their case. Evidence always looks better when it is unopposed and 
unchallenged.196
For the ICC Prosecutor, Abu Garda case is crucially important for the 
situation in Darfur because when other suspects are all at large, Abu Garda 
is the first one who voluntarily appeared before the Court. His appearance 
advanced the proceeding into stage of confirmation of charges and drugged 
the proceedings out of the deadlock. The successful confirmation of charges 
would have been a possible opportunity where the Prosecutor could use it to 
save the credibility of the Court and his own fame which were doubted 
worldwidely due to Al Bashir Arrest Warrant. However, he was definitely 
confronted with the very challenge that Louise Arbour had been afraid of 
and lost the case. 
  
                                               
196 Ibid. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
It seems that, the ICC Prosecutor have been faced with more criticism than 
compliment when he play his role in dealing with Darfur crisis at the arena 
of internatinoal criminal justice, both the manner in which he has carried out 
investigation, identified suspects to arrest outside the courtroom and proved 
charged crimes in the courtroom. 
Nevertheless, it is unwarranted to evaluate whether the Prosecutor is a well 
qualified or not and whether he performs his mandate appropriately, without 
taking into other variables. 197
Mr. Luis Ocampo-Moreno is the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICC and he 
doubtlessly understood the structural and political constraints he faced as 
the first chief prosecutor. For such a figure with a huge mandate but weak 
equipment, he was making headway against the huge difficulties of building 
and operating the OTP while under crushing pressure to avoid political 
missteps but to stride boldly against a wide range of crimes and criminals. 
 His role as a Prosecutor of a permanent 
international criminal court depends on many factors, such as the 
mechanism designed in the Rome Statute including powers of the 
Prosecutor, the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council, 
and even rules of proof and evidence.  
Though it would blend justice with politics when talking of these issues in 
the framework of politics, it is unrealistic to isolate international justice 
from the complex political environment where it is seated. And there is no 
doubt that Prosecutor’s assessment of world climate and attitudes of states 
concerned is the very leverage that he utilizes to identify situations and 
cases, suspect targeting and strategy employment. 
As the first situation referred by the Security Council, it is also the first time 
to test his ability to deal with defiant state government, non-cooperative 
regional organization and inactive Security Council at the same time. 
Confronted by the challenge of establishing the credibility of the Court and 
                                               
197 Some commentators gave a particularly critical assessment, see Julie Flint and Alex de 
Waal, ’Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Orders’, World Affairs Journal, spring 2009. 
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demonstrating that it is able to share the role in conflict resolution in a 
judicial approach with a political organ the Security Council, some attempts 
have to be made.  
Some lessons and experience could be drawn from these unsuccessful 
attempts for the future similar situations and for his successors. At least two 
respects could be sketched here. 
First, almost each situation arriving at the ICC, regardless referred by the 
Security Council, by the State parties or initiated by the Prosecutor on his 
own, would be necessarily mixed with political elements. Confronted with 
the tension between justice and politics, though some attempts could be and 
should be explored for the pursuit of justice, the Prosecutor, before making 
decisions and implementing them, should predict possible outcomes and 
impacts by assessing political climate and availability of resources he could 
obtain and keep in mind that the Court always suffers from its fatal 
weakness in lack of enforcement power. It would be unwise to make risky 
attempts at the cost of the credibility of the ICC and authority of his own, 
particularly when the ICC is young.  
Secondly, it is understandable that as the first chief prosecutor, like those 
law elite in ad hoc Tribunals who developed smart prosecutorial strategy 
and outstanding doctrines of international criminal law in their judicial 
practice, Mr. Ocampo-Moreno also would like to make some innovations by 
every means, such as a new mode of liability in the Al Bashir Arrest 
Warrant, either for better realization of international criminal justice or for 
development of international criminal law and contribution to academics, 
but such ambitious prospects should not overide his mandate and mission as 
a prosecutor-to successfully prosecute the perpetrators who otherwise would 
go unpunished. 
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Supplement  
UNSC Resolution 1593  
“The Security Council, 
 
“Taking note of the report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law in Darfur (S/2005/60), 
 
“Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no 
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the 
International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security 
Council request to that effect, 
 
“Also recalling articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute and 
encouraging States to contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims, 
 
“Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98-
2 of the Rome Statute, 
 
“Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security, 
 
“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
“1.   Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 
 
“2.   Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to 
the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary 
assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, 
while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no 
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obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and 
other international organizations to cooperate fully; 
 
“3.   Invites the Court and the African Union to discuss practical 
arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, 
including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which 
would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity; 
 
“4.   Also encourages the Court, as appropriate and in accordance 
with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic 
efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat 
impunity in Darfur; 
 
“5.   Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation 
and encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all 
sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation 
commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby 
reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace, with African Union and 
international support as necessary; 
 
“6.   Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising 
out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the 
Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been 
expressly waived by that contributing State; 
 
“7.   Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection 
with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or 
prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United 
Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute 
and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily; 
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“8.   Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three 
months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months 
thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution; 
 
“9.   Decides to remain seized of the matter.” 
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